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In recent years, commentators have begun to take seriously the
problem of missing evidence, specifically, evidence that should be
presented by the parties but is not.1 In a previous paper, I analyzed
the considerable variety of tools employed by the law to address this
problem and made some relatively modest suggestions concerning
the nature and use of such tools.2 In this paper, my former modesty is
less evident: I develop the outlines of an explicit and practical pro-
posal for addressing the problem.
My principal claim is that the burden of proof should reflect the
need to avoid rendering a judgment on the basis of an evidentiary
package that is unreasonably incomplete, completeness being meas-
ured relative to the total package of evidence that is (or should have
been) reasonably available to the tribunal.3 This thesis qualifies and
improves the now conventional view, described in more detail in Part
I, that conceives the burden of proof entirely in terms of: (a) using
the burden of persuasion to optimize risks associated with alternative
decisions; and (b) using the burden of production to monitor assess-
ments of probability by the trier of fact for plausibility. More specifi-
cally, the problem of unreasonable evidential incompleteness impli-
cates the burden of production by invoking a judicial responsibility to
monitor not only the plausibility of alternative probability assess-
ments, but also the appropriateness of making such a probability as-
sessment on the current state of the evidence.
Prevailing practice confuses matters by assigning to the trier of
fact too much responsibility for taking such incompleteness into ac-
count. Although this tendency is understandable, and probably does
* Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. I am
grateful for helpful conversations with Steve Clymer, Jacob Corrd, Jim Henderson, and
Alex Stein, and for financial support from Cornell Law School and the Marshall D. Ewell
Research Fund through Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. One subcategory of this problem, the destruction or suppression of evidence, has
received particular attention in the literature. See, e.g., DESTRUCrION OF EVIDENCE (J.
Gorelick et. al. eds., 1989).
2. See Dale A. Nance, Missing Evidence, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 831 (1991).
3. Earlier writers have given some attention to the role of the burden of proof in
regulating evidential completeness, and the present paper builds on that work, but their
analyses differ considerably from mine. I note some of these contributions at relevant
points infra.
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no great harm in some cases, it is nonetheless fraught with difficulties
both theoretical and practical. While most obviously problematic in
jury trials, the resulting confusion affects bench trials as well.
Perhaps the best way to summarize my specific proposals is to
state what I anticipate to be the probable systemic consequences of
adopting them. First, it would entail a substantial decrease in the use
of missing evidence arguments to juries and associated jury instruc-
tions. On the other hand, it would entail a modest but significant in-
crease in the use of peremptory judgments, dismissals, and defaults
based on the omission of evidence. It would also entail a significant
increase in the explicitness with which courts monitor parties' choices
about what evidence not to develop or not to present. Finally, and
most important, cases decided on their factual merits would be more
accurately decided by virtue of improvements in the evidential basis
of decision.
I. The Conventional Model of Proof Burdens
The now conventional understanding of the burden of proof is
that the level or weight of the burden of persuasion is determined by
the expected utilities associated with correct and incorrect alternative
decisions. First clearly articulated in pathbreaking work by John
Kaplan,4 this view has been developed and refined by other scholars.5
It has also been endorsed and applied by the Supreme Court in its
due process decisions, where the Court has expressly weighed the
consequences of a mistaken ruling for the plaintiff or prosecution
against the consequences of a mistaken ruling in favor of the defen-
dant or accused in deciding what standard of persuasion is constitu-
tionally required.6
The idea can be formalized succinctly in the following way, gen-
eralizing somewhat from Professor Kaplan's treatment. Assume for
simplicity that the court is called upon to make a determination of H
or not-H in order to apply the substantive law in a two-party lawsuit;
the plaintiff or prosecution ("") should win if H were known to be
true, and the defendant or accused ("A") should win if H were known
4. See John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV.
1065 (1968).
5. See, e.g., David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard:
Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 487.
6. The seminal decision was In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (especially Justice
Harlan's concurrence at 369-72). The framework has since been applied in cases such as
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); and
Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574 (1987).
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to be false.
7 
In the actual state of uncertainty about the truth of hy-
pothesis H, let Pr(H) represent the trier's assessment of the prob-
ability of H at the conclusion of all the evidence, and let:
U(+) be the increase in utility attributable to a "true positive," a
correct determination that H is true;
U(-) be the increase in utility attributable to a "true negative," a
correct determination that H is false;
D(+) be the magnitude of the decrease in utility attributable to a
"false positive," an incorrect determination that H is true; and
D(-) be the magnitude of the decrease in utility attributable to a
"false negative," an incorrect determination that H is false.
t
Then, the net expected change in utility of a decision for n is just the ex-
pected gain from a true positive less the expected loss from a false positive,
or
[Pr(H) x U(+)] - [(1 - Pr(H)) x D(+)],
while the net expected change in utility of a decision for A is just the ex-
pected gain from a true negative less the expected loss from a false negative,
or
[(1 - Pr(H)) x U(-)] - [Pr(H) x D(-)].
Thus, a decision for a is better than one for A if and only if the former quan-
tity exceeds the latter, or
Pr(H) > P* -----------------------------..............
U(+) + D (-)
U(-) + D (+)
7. H can be either a simple proposition of fact ("Defendant is the one who commit-
ted what is known to have been a murder") or a complex conjunction of elements ("De-
fendant was negligent and thereby proximately caused the injury to the plaintiff"). For
reasons that I have detailed elsewhere, I am not persuaded that extant law founders on
any significant paradox when conjunctive events are considered. See Dale A. Nance, A
Comment on the Supposed Paradoxes of a Mathematical Interpretation of the Logic of Tri-
als, 66 B.U. L. REV. 947 (1986). And to the extent that it does generate paradox, that
may simply reflect a defect in the law that needs to be addressed. See Richard Friedman,
Answering the Bayesioskeptical Challenge, 1 INT'L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 276, 279-84
(1997).
8. All these changes are relative to the status quo ante, which is a state of indeci-
sion. Purists might wish to see the probability of the hypothesis expressed in conditional
terms, as Pr(HIE), where E represents the evidence in the case, but I have made the con-
ditional nature of Pr(H) clear in the text. Also, I should note that the probability function
is assumed to satisfy the traditional Kolmogorov axioms for mathematical probabilities,
but how the trier of fact arrives at Pr(H) is unspecified. In other words, the model in this
form does not assume Bayesian revisions of prior probabilities. See Kaplan, supra note 4,
at 1083-91 (discussing Bayesian revisions as another aspect of a decision-theoretic ap-
proach).
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Obviously, P* varies according to the utilities involved, which
are publicly determined based on the nature of the case. In particu-
lar, a relatively large decrease in utility from a false positive (as in
criminal prosecutions for which D(+) is much greater than D(-)
while U(+) is approximately equal to U(-)) yields a relatively high
P*, while symmetric utilities (as in civil cases for which U(+) = U(-)
and D(+) = D(-)) yield P* = .5.9 Also publicly determined is the
identity of the party to be favored in the event that the trier of fact
cannot determine which is greater, Pr(H) or p*.0
Of course, in real trials the degree of precision in the specifica-
tion of P* varies, from civil cases where the preponderance standard
is sometimes, but not always, defined in terms of "more probable
than not," to criminal cases in which the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard has notoriously defied more precise definition. Al-
though perhaps not part of the standard interpretation, it is nonethe-
less plausible to conceive of the formal standards of persuasion as
setting limits on a range of possible values for P*, with some degree
of flexibility for the trier of fact in fixing the P* for a particular case."
For example, under the "preponderance of the evidence" standard,
one might imagine a range of permissible P* values for the trier to
adopt, say between .4 and .7; for a "clear and convincing evidence"
standard, a range between .7 and .9; and for a "beyond reasonable
doubt" standard, a range between .9 and 1. The ranges might also
overlap. 2
Once the standard of proof is determined as the critical prob-
ability P* that must be exceeded, the principal remaining question is
whether the probability of the ultimate fact in issue exceeds P*. This,
9. I do not mean to suggest that the typical civil case is rightly viewed as involving
such symmetry, although that appears to be the general consensus. See Dale A. Nance,
Civility and the Burden of Proof, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 647 (1994) (arguing, inter
alia, that conventional accounts of allocation and weighting in civil cases understate the
role of the principle of civility, by which parties should be presumed to act in compliance
with serious social norms).
10. If P* > .5, the burden of persuasion would surely be said to rest upon 7t even if R
is assigned the win when Pr(H) = P* (an assignment unknown in the law). But if P* = .5.
then the burden of persuasion is on the party who is supposed to lose in the event that
Pr(H) = P*, in civil cases usually the plaintiff.
11. Professor Kaplan recognized both the existence of and the need for such flexibil-
ity, as well as the dangers thereof, at least in criminal cases. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at
1072-77. Cf Richard 0. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1035-36
(1977) (arguing that the "ideal juror" has no discretion in setting P* and that any discre-
tion inherent in the vague formulae used to instruct jurors is the source of potential
prejudice in the jurors' adjustment of P*).
12. This would help to legitimate both the variability and the level of estimates pro-
vided by persons asked to quantify the various burdens of proof. See, e.g., Rita James
Simon & Linda Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof- A View from the Bench, the Jury,
and the Classroom, 5 L. & SoC'Y REV. 319 (1971).
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of course, is the central question to be answered by the trier of fact.
But ancillary to this issue is one addressed by the court as a matter of
law, namely whether a party has the obligation to present further
evidence as to H or, in default thereof, to suffer an adverse judgment.
This is conventionally identified as the "burden of production," and it
can fall on either party according to the weight of the evidence at the
time the decision is made. 3 It is usually understood as translating
simply into a decision about whether, given the evidence before the
court, a reasonable trier of fact could plausibly estimate P* in such a
way as to favor the party whose burden of production is in question. 4
Although the foregoing is a powerful explanatory framework,
my claim is that the burden of production should not be limited to
the "plausibility" role described above. 15 Rather, the burden of pro-
duction should also extend to monitoring the evidence for complete-
ness, within reason. That is, the judge should determine if it is rea-
sonable, in light of evidence not presented, to decide whether or not
Pr(H) > P*. We already know this to be so, at least to the limited ex-
tent that the burden of production requires, for example, the intro-
duction of some evidence on H even if, in the absence of any formally
introduced evidence, a reasonable trier of fact could think either that
Pr(H) > P* or that Pr(H) < P*. But the significance of this kind of
qualification of the basic model is not fully appreciated.
16
13. See GRAHAM LILLY, AN INTRODUCriON TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 3.1 (3d
ed. 1996). So conceived, the burden of production is ancillary to the burden of persuasion
in that there would be no way to give concrete meaning to the burden of production with-
out an identified burden of persuasion. In contrast, the idea of a burden of persuasion is
entirely intelligible without reference to any burden of production, as in non-adversarial
systems of adjudication.
14. Over time, the law has clearly come to recognize that the measure of the burden
of production, in the sense described here, is a relative concept that depends on the appli-
cable standard of persuasion. In a criminal case, for example, the standard applicable in
deciding whether the prosecution has met its burden of production is whether a reason-
able juror could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See 2 JOHN W.
STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 338, at 433-34 (4th ed. 1992) (hereinafter
"MCCORMICK"].
15. The idea that the burden of production has a component beyond the plausibility
function is not really novel. Already there are several special corroboration requirements
or other specific rules about evidence that must be present to warrant judgment regard-
less of Pr(H). See JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., EVIDENCE 101 (5th ed. 1995). The exact
relationship of these rules to the conventional model is usually unclear.
16. Professor Richard Friedman, in his textbook on evidence, struggles to explain
this phenomenon in a way consistent with the conventional model as described in the text.
RICHARD FRIEDMAN, THE ELEMENTS OF EVIDENCE 22-23 (1991). He asserts that the
trier of fact cannot have an initial Pr(H) that is greater than P* because prior to the tak-
ing of evidence, the event alleged in the case must be considered inherently unlikely, too
unlikely to exceed any standard of persuasion in use by the courts. See id. at 22-23. He
comments parenthetically, "Of course, we may have a tendency to rate the probability
significantly higher, given our knowledge that the plaintiff has brought a lawsuit alleging
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I have articulated the foregoing model as a convenient reference
point for the following discussion. However, I should note here that
my argument qualifies other frameworks as well. In particular, my
argument qualifies any theory of proof burdens that posits only ar-
rangements for making and monitoring a comparison of Pr(H) with a
fixed probability P*, however precisely P* is specified and whatever
factors enter into such specification. Furthermore, my argument
qualifies some models of proof burdens that do not involve a fixed
P*, such as the theory that the plaintiff in a civil action should win if
and only if the probability that the plaintiff's story is true is greater
than the probability that the defendant's story is true. 7 The problem
of missing evidence only aggravates the major weakness of such a
theory, its suppression of stories that are closer to the truth but for
which neither party vouches in their pleadings.'8 In any event, in
what follows I will refer only to the conventional model as the basis
for my arguments.
I. The Problem of Evidential Incompleteness
Identifying the problem. Suppose you are the trier of fact and
law in a case of alleged rape. Defendant does not deny that a rape
occurred, but denies that he is the perpetrator. The evidentiary
package available to you includes the following: (1) unimpeached
eye-witness identification of the defendant by the victim, in a police
line-up as well as at trial; (2) unimpeached eye-witness identification
of the defendant by a neutral third person who claims to have ob-
served the defendant leaving the victim's apartment on the night of
the rape; (3) a custodial confession by the defendant, since retracted
but still admissible; (4) defendant's uncorroborated testimony that he
was at home alone during the relevant time period. There is no addi-
tional evidence, beside the fact that defendant lives in the victim's
neighborhood and that the rape occurred in the victim's home. Un-
this to be true, but the allegation is not itself evidence, and should not be considered in
evaluating the probability of liability." Id. at 23. To the fact of an allegation one should
add the fact that the case has not settled before trial. These facts must certainly be known
to the trier of fact, and it seems to stretch credulity to insist that a "reasonable" juror will
ignore them. That does not mean that a judge should consider these facts in deciding the
question of a directed verdict, but then one needs a good explanation of why the judge
ought to ignore what the jury reasonably believes to be relevant. I suggest that it is be-
cause in virtually every imaginable case, no evidence on a material fact, beyond the in-
formal evidence just mentioned, is evidence that is unreasonably incomplete.
17. See Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 401,
405-08 (1986).
18. Moreover, for want of a specific P*, such a theory does not offer even the possi-
bility of making adjustments to P* as a way of handling evidential incompleteness. The
possibility of adjusting P* to take account of missing evidence is discussed infra in Part V.
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der these conditions, would you conclude that defendant's guilt has
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt?
My answer to this question is "Yes and no." On the one hand, I
would certainly place the probability of guilt under the proven facts
at a very high level, above 95%. On the other hand, there has been
no testimony concerning scientific evidence such as hair samples, fin-
gerprints, or analysis of semen, evidence which one knows to be rou-
tinely and rightly sought in such cases if possible, and there has been
no testimony to explain why such evidence is not available. Thus, my
probability of guilt would not be as high as it would be if inculpatory
scientific evidence were introduced, or if the absence of scientific
evidence were plausibly explained in a manner consistent with guilt.
But my probability of guilt would nonetheless be very high, and could
be high enough to exceed any plausible quantitative measure of the
standard of proof that is viewed as fixed for all cases of the type.' 9
To put the point simply, perhaps misleadingly so, no doubt about
guilt is reasonable, no matter how small it may be, if it is the product
of an unreasonably incomplete state of the evidence. 2 I say "perhaps
misleadingly" because the "reasonable doubt" standard lends itself to
such an explanation, but the same point applies in a civil case when
some other standard, such as "preponderance of the evidence" or
"clear and convincing evidence," is employed. Indeed the point is
quite independent of the required standard of persuasion. Thus, in
the civil context, no doubt about whether the defendant committed a
tort or a breach of contract is acceptable if it is the product of an un-
reasonably incomplete state of the evidence.
Articulating a criterion. These intuitively plausible claims can
only be made good if the notion of unreasonable incompleteness is
adequately articulated. Under what conditions, then, is the package
of evidence to be considered unreasonably incomplete? Evidence is
unreasonably incomplete if and only if either of two conditions is
met: (1) there exists admissible evidence that can be obtained for use
19. The example I have chosen involves missing scientific evidence, but the same
analytical problem could arise in other contexts, for example, if the evidence that is miss-
ing is the testimony of someone who could be expected to have been an eye-witness. See,
e.g., David H. Kaye, Do We Need A Calculus of Weight to Understand Proof Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt?, 66 B.U. L. REV. 657, 663 n.16 (1986) (describing a news reporter's
interview with jurors, one of whom asked rhetorically during deliberations why the de-
fendant did not call as a corroborating witness someone whom the defendant mentioned
during his testimony).
20. See id. at 663-64 (recounting a jury's acquittal on grounds of reasonable doubt
due to the prosecution's failure to present "breathalyzer" evidence). Professor Kaye
rightly notes that it can be difficult to know in such cases whether the acquittal stems from
a judgment that, because of the omission, Pr(H) < P*, or from a judgment that the prose-
cution should lose because of the omission even though Pr(H) > P*. See iL at 664 n.17.
Mar. 1998]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
in the trial without an expenditure of resources that is unreasonable
(in light of the nature of the controversy and the significance of the
evidence), the non-presentation of which is not excusable under a
rule of privilege or pursuant to some legitimate consideration other
than obtaining a tactical advantage in the case (a "reversible defi-
ciency"); or (2) evidence that would have satisfied (1) has been
caused not to by the faulty conduct of a party or of persons, such as
counsel, whose conduct may rightly be attributed to a party (an "irre-
versible deficiency by fault"). 21 The rape case hypothetical described
above might involve either type, depending on whether the scientific
evidence is still reasonably available and, if not, whether it would
have been reasonably available had the parties acted properly.
The most immediate consequence of my criterion is that a loss of
evidence that is both irreversible and the result of accident, or of
conduct not attributable to a party, does not render the package of
evidence unreasonably incomplete. For example, in the rape hypo-
thetical, the victim, in a state of such disorientation or fear as to pre-
clude a finding of fault, might have destroyed a semen sample before
the police were able to collect it. Or the police van might have been
involved in a freakish accident, losing irreplaceable physical evidence
despite all reasonable precautions. Such deficiencies are the fortu-
ities of legal life, subject to which the parties must litigate and the
trier of fact must make a decision, no less so than the fact that certain
imaginable evidence was never available at all. Of course, if the re-
sult of such a party-innocent and irreversible deficiency is that the
evidence is insufficient to warrant a finding by the appropriate stan-
dard of persuasion, then a directed verdict is appropriate. But that is
distinct from the issue being addressed here. That is, evidence can be
insufficient even if it is reasonably complete. To put the matter suc-
cinctly, evidential sufficiency, that which properly allows the case to
go to verdict, entails both (1) plausibility of alternative results under
the burden of persuasion, given the evidence, and (2) reasonable
completeness of the evidence.22
21. For now, the reader should understand "faulty" conduct as including both acts
intended to deprive the court of evidence and acts negligently causing the loss of evi-
dence. Mere omissions-failures to act-that cause irreversible loss of evidence will gen-
erate unreasonable incompleteness only if there was a duty to collect or preserve the evi-
dence in question. This is a difficult matter about which I offer no opinions here except to
note that the most plausible non-contractual duty of-this sort applies to the prosecution in
criminal cases. See, e.g., Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (addressing the "bad
faith" standard to be employed in due process challenges based on the prosecution's fail-
ure to collect and preserve evidence). In the context of reversible deficiencies, however,
such an affirmative duty to act can arise simply by virtue of judicial recognition of the
need for the evidence in question.
22. Jonathan Cohen made a similar point in the context of criminal trials:
[Vol. 49
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Of course, determining whether evidence is unreasonably in-
complete entails not only factual judgments and judgments of poten-
tial admissibility, but also a judgment of importance. For example,
the presented evidence is not unreasonably incomplete when the
missing evidence, though readily available, is merely cumulative or
relates only to an uncontroverted point, or when the missing evidence
is the potential testimony of a wholly unreliable person. Beyond that,
the omission of evidence should be excusable if it is unlikely that its
presentation would change the result under the applicable standard
of persuasion, assuming its content to be as favorable to such a
change as is plausible.' In an adversarial system, these determina-
tions, whether made by judge or jury, must rely to a considerable ex-
tent on information supplied by the parties as to both the nature of
the potential evidence and why it has not been presented.24
[Tihe standard of proof that has to be met is satisfied only by what it would be
reasonable to regard as a maximization of weight ....
... [T]he weight of the evidence obtained is being assessed by comparison with
the supposed totality of relevant facts .... So, even if we had all the available
evidence, our argument might still not have maximal weight. Sometimes the
prosecution cannot prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt because some crucial
issue happens in practice to be undeterminable.
L. Jonathan Cohen, The Role of Evidential Weight in Criminal Proof, 66 B.U. L. REV.
635, 640, 642 (1986). Superficially, this might look like the same point I make in the text,
but since Professor Cohen explicitly rejects the Pr(H) > P* formulation of the burden of
persuasion, it is clear that he claims that conviction can be unwarranted because of a lack
of evidence even if all reasonably available evidence has been considered and Pr(H) > P*.
Furthermore, it appears from his discussion that this is not because evidence that once
was reasonably available has become no longer so due to governmental misconduct. See
id at 642 (basing the comment quoted above on the hypothetical that "a vital eye-witness
has died without ever disclosing what he saw," but giving no indication that the death was
due to the wrongdoing of a party). But why extant (or once extant) but now innocently
unavailable evidence should be treated differently from never extant evidence is not ex-
plained. Professor Cohen refers to the necessary maximal weight being that which arises
from having the "totality of the relevant facts," id at 636, but he fails to explain how to
draw a meaningful stopping point between the totality of reasonably available evidence,
on the one hand, and plain certainty, on the other.
23. This might seem to conflict with my claim that the matter of evidential complete-
ness is independent of the standard of persuasion. What I mean here is that it is not inde-
pendent of the difference between Pr(H) and P* at the time when the determination
about completeness is made.
24. The determination is thus roughly analogous to deciding whether error in the ex-
clusion of evidence has been harmless. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 1.7 (1995). The main difference is that harmless error is
generally, though not invariably, judged in the context of erroneously admitted evidence
or an offer of proof for erroneously excluded evidence, so that the appellate court has a
particularly good sense of the nature of the evidence at issue. See FED. R. EVID. 103(a),
(d). In the present context, to be sure, indications of the nature of the foregone evidence,
such as the deposition of a witness that neither party calls, can be made available to the
trial judge (or jury) deciding in the first instance whether the evidence is reasonably com-
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One might quibble with my criterion of unreasonableness, call-
ing for adjustments in the arguments below. But for now, the impor-
tant question is, given a suitable criterion of unreasonable incom-
pleteness, if you agree with me about my responses to the
hypothetical or can imagine a case in which you would reach the
same set of judgments, what should the law do in response?
The need to respond. The answer obviously depends on context
and alternatives. In an adversarial system, irreversible deficiencies
by fault are certainly subject to penalties of various sorts, from dis-
covery sanctions, to spoliation inferences at trial, to separate actions
in tort, but still lacking is an adequate theory of how best to integrate
these various responses. With regard to reversible deficiencies, there
is certainly reason to doubt that further official responses to incom-
pleteness are even necessary. The thoroughness with which adver-
saries investigate cases is often and rightly viewed as both a strength
and, in the case of excessive investigation or discovery, a weakness of
the common-law system of adjudication. Given such discovery, and
the sanctions necessary to enforce it, one may plausibly conclude that
if evidence is valuable and reasonably available, then the party it fa-
vors will have adequate incentive to acquire and introduce it. If it
does not favor either side, then it is irrelevant and superfluous. And
if it is relevant but too expensive or even impossible to obtain, then
again non-presentation is perfectly appropriate.
I agree with this view as a general proposition, both as to the
positive and negative aspects of adversarial litigation. Nevertheless,
there are occasions on which an adversarial system, or at least our
adversarial system, fails to produce a suitably complete evidentiary
package, not only because of irreversible deficiencies by fault, but
also because of reversible deficiencies. Cases like the rape hypo-
thetical with which I began my discussion do arise, and sometimes
they involve reversible deficiencies.' Comparable civil cases also
appear in the reports.26
plete.
25. See, e.g., People v. Park, 380 N.E.2d 795 (Ill. 1978) (affirming reversal of a con-
viction for insufficiency of evidence despite what should have been considered convincing
evidence of guilt, emphasizing the ready availability of highly probative scientific evi-
dence not presented in the case). See also United States v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798, 799 (9th
Cir. 1976) (applying rule that upon demand of defendant, prosecution must produce a ma-
terial witness-informant who is reasonably available); G.E.G. v. State, 417 So. 2d 975, 977
(Fla. 1982) (holding that upon demand of a defendant charged with possession, the prose-
cution must introduce the controlled substance if it is available); People v. Tann, 40
N.W.2d 184, 186 (Mich. 1949) (reversing conviction for prosecution's failure to call eye-
witness, but not addressing whether the jury could reasonably have found that the evi-
dence satisfied the burden of persuasion without that witness).
26. In civil cases, judicial concern about evidential completeness is particularly likely
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49
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To be sure, it is often difficult to discern in these cases exactly
why the adversarial incentives failed to generate a complete eviden-
tiary package, at least when the missing evidence is still reasonably
available at the time of trial. But it is not difficult to identify general
sources of incompleteness beyond the obvious incentives to destroy
or suppress evidence. They include: lack of diligence of counsel; dif-
ferences of opinion (between counsel and court) about whether par-
ticular evidence is sufficiently probative to justify the expenditures
associated with obtaining and presenting it; defects in the system of
pretrial discovery that prevent the party favored by given evidence
from obtaining it; and asymmetries in exclusionary rules that prevent
only the party favored by the evidence from presenting it.27
Of course, whether these gaps call for a legal response of some
sort depends in part upon how important one considers accuracy of
adjudication. While it is clearly very important in criminal cases, one
can anticipate arguments that accuracy is of less importance in civil
cases compared, for example, to the goal of resolving disputes. I can-
not enter that debate here. It suffices to say that my analysis presup-
poses that accuracy of adjudication is very important at trial, even in
civil cases. I can see no other coherent way to interpret the role of
adjudication in a system of laws, what we ask the trier of fact to do
within that system, or the evidentiary rules that we employ in assist-
to surface in a procedural way that tends to conceal its importance. See, e.g., Linkhart v.
Savely, 227 P.2d 187,192 (Or. 1951), in which the court used a strange reading of pleading
requirements in order to exclude plaintiff's testimony about sight-impairment, conspicu-
ously taking judicial notice of more accurate scientific evidence readily available to plain-
tiff but not presented in court. And, as in many criminal cases, even when the court is ex-
pressly concerned about completeness, it is sometimes difficult to discern whether the
court's response is attributable to a conclusion that because of the omission (a jury could
only reasonably conclude that) Pr(H) < P*, or attributable to a need to respond to the
omission even though (a jury could reasonably conclude that) Pr(H) > P*. See, e.g., Hirst
v. Gertzen, 676 F.2d 1252, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding plaintiff's evidence of dis-
criminatory jury selection insufficient because of plaintiff's failure to present readily
available analysis of records of jury selection); Galbraith v. Busch, 196 N.E. 36, 38-39
(N.Y. 1935) (holding that plaintiff in car accident case failed to meet the burden of proof
by not calling nominal defendants, who were in fact aligned with plaintiff and who were in
the best position to know the cause of the accident); Warren v. Jeffries, 139 S.E.2d 718,
720 (N.C. 1965) (noting plaintiff's failure to inspect condition of car involved in accident
in ruling evidence of negligence insufficient).
27. See Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REv. 227, 263-70
(1988). In his recent book, Professor Damagka also argues that the polarization inherent
in adversarial methods causes underutilization of evidence possessing weak but not insig-
nificant probative value. See MIRJAN R. DAMA§KA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 98-100
(1997). On the problem of asymmetric exclusionary rules, and the doctrine of complete-
ness that has arisen to handle many aspects thereof, see Dale A. Nance, A Theory of Ver-
bal Completeness, 80 IOWA L. REV. 825 (1995); Dale A. Nance, Verbal Completeness and
Exclusionary Rules Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 75 TEx. L. REV. 51 (1996).
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ing the trier in its task.28 In any event, the judgment of importance
that is involved in deciding whether evidence is unreasonably incom-
plete should be sensitive to the relative importance of accuracy in the
particular context.29
Wrongful destruction of evidence by a non-party. As I have
characterized unreasonable incompleteness, wrongful destruction of
evidence by a person whose conduct is not attributable to a party
does not render the evidence unreasonably incomplete any more
than would evidence destruction that is entirely innocent. In other
words, whatever "wrongfulness" means in such a context, neither
wrongful nor faultless destruction of evidence by a non-party impli-
cates the burden of production except insofar as the effect of the loss,
regardless of its cause, is to render it implausible to believe that
Pr(H) > P* given the evidence that is introduced.
Nonetheless, wrongful destruction of evidence, which in the con-
text of a non-party is most likely to be the result of negligence, should
not be free of legal consequences, damnum absque injuria. I can see
no good argument that negligent damage to a legal claim or defense
is less important than, say, negligent destruction of physical property
of comparable value. Proof problems generate the principal argu-
ment against tort liability to the affected parties.30  Despite proof
problems, there is substantial law supporting liability under the tort
of evidence spoliation, although there continues to be disagreement
over whether liability should be imposed for mere negligence and
over the precise measure of recovery.3' In any event, my concern is
with the relationship between missing evidence and the burden of
proof in the underlying litigation, and non-party destruction, whether
faulty or not, is no different in this regard than purely accidental de-
struction by a party.
28. See generally Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, supra note 27.
29. In order to avoid misunderstanding, I should also note that I do not claim that
problems of unreasonable evidential incompleteness are increasing in frequency or im-
portance. My concern is how to deal with the problem when it arises, however rare that
may be. Of course, one could argue that if the rate of incidence of this sort of evidentiary
deficiency is extremely low, then it is not worth the time and effort to develop and, more
important, to implement a comprehensive system of response. But the existence of many
rules and cases that address incompleteness, albeit unsystematically, indicates that the
problem deserves more systematic treatment.
30. The question is addressed at length in a recent article by Ariel Porat and Alex
Stein, Liability for Uncertainty: Making Evidential Damage Actionable, 18 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1891, 1899 (1997), and I will do no more here than indicate general agreement with
their argument in favor of monetary liability for evidential damage to civil claims. In ac-
cord with much developing law, Porat and Stein also argue in favor of applying such a tort
remedy in the context of evidential damage by a party. I reject that idea for reasons
stated infra in Part IV.
31. See generally DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE, supra note 1, at §§ 4.1 -.23.
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I. Why Discounting by the Trier of Fact is Inadequate
One oft-employed solution to the problem of evidential incom-
pleteness is to leave the matter to the good judgment of the trier of
fact in ascertaining Pr(H). The trier of fact (whether judge or jury)
can and will "discount" the probability of the ultimate fact at issue in
light of the absence of evidence, at least so long as that absence is no-
ticed by the trier sua sponte or brought to the trier's attention by ar-
guments of counsel.32 In my rape hypothetical, for example, the trier
of fact can adjust the probability that the defendant is the perpetrator
according to the inferences to be drawn from the fact that neither the
prosecution nor the defense has presented the scientific evidence or
an explanation for its absence. Thus, it may be argued, while my
judgment puts the probability of guilt above 95% based solely upon
the evidence actually presented in the case, once I take into account
the additional item of evidence, consisting of the failure to present
the missing evidence or explain its non-presentation, then my judg-
ment of the probability might drop to something below 95%, and that
can explain my verdict of not (proven) guilty.' Of course, a similar
adjustment is possible in civil cases.34
There can be no doubt that this sort of thing happens. Indeed, it
is fair to say that jury discounting is most frequently the remedy of
choice under current practice.35 In the following paragraphs, how-
ever, I survey several problems that affect the suitability and ade-
quacy of relying on this remedy. Lest the reader suspect a hidden
"anti-jury" agenda here, I hasten to add that my skepticism about
relying on jury discounting does not derive from doubts about the
competence of lay juries. The arguments canvassed below are
equally applicable to a judge or even a panel of experts sitting as the
trier of fact. The source of the identified difficulties is the distinct
role that we assign to the trier of fact, not the characteristics of the
32. I shall use the term "discounting" generally, even though in some cases the jury
would obviously increase what would otherwise be Pr(H) on account of the omission.
Also, references to the "jury" should be understood as referring to the judge when acting
as trier of fact, unless the context indicates otherwise.
33. The most concise description of this effect is provided in Kaye, supra note 19.
34. This has been much discussed in the context of so-called "naked statistical evi-
dence" cases, the argument being that Pr(H) might be adjusted downward, with a result
favoring the defense, because such evidence is almost never the only available evidence.
See, e.g., Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of
Proof, 66 B.U. L. REV. 439, 454-62 (1986) (discussing the famous "Gatecrasher Para-
dox").
35. See, e.g., Richard Friedman, Dealing With Evidentiary Deficiency, 18 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1961, 1963-65 (1997) (arguing that relying on jury inferences is probably the




person or persons we choose to fill that role. Indeed, my arguments
should be understood as indicating a need to protect the jury from
being asked to perform functions incompatible with its ostensible
role.
The problem of incentives. The most that a trier of fact may do,
at least legitimately, is to render a verdict on the underlying claim
that is contrary to what it would have determined had the evidential
omission not been taken into account. For a narrowly instrumental
litigant who is likely to lose anyway, the risk of detection and adverse
verdict may constitute little disincentive to suppress evidence. The
point is entirely analogous to the problem of using purely compensa-
tory remedies under substantive law.36 It means that distinct punitive
responses of some sort are required in order to control such instru-
mentalism among litigants and their attorneys. These responses are
usually beyond the scope of a jury's legitimate decisionmaking in the
underlying litigation. 7 This problem is at least addressed by present
criminal law governing obstruction of justice as well as the availabil-
ity of punitive damages under the relatively new spoliation tort.
Without some such measures, extrinsic to the question of inferences
on the merits of the underlying claims, significant incentives to sup-
press evidence would remain, and accuracy would be adversely af-
fected, especially when the resulting suppression goes undetected.
The problem of incomplete substitutability. Even if we limit at-
tention to cases in which the evidential deficiency is identified by the
court, there is no guarantee that in every such case discounting will
change the result that would otherwise be reached under the measure
of P* that has been legally fixed. Of course, it is not inevitable that
such a change should occur, if "should" is measured relative to the
36. See Nance, supra note 2, at 874-75. For a systematic examination of the amoral
litigant's incentives in civil litigation, arguing that much more vigorous legal responses to
evidence destruction are needed, see Charles R. Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence
in Civil Litigation: The Need for Vigorous Judicial Action, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 793
(1991).
37. There can be little doubt that juries sometimes render illegitimate punitive ver-
dicts. For example, if punitive damages are otherwise at issue in the case, it is possible for
the trier of fact to take into account a defendant's conduct in regard to evidence, as dis-
tinct from the defendant's conduct which led to the litigation, when setting an appropriate
punitive award. Of course, it is procedurally improper for the jury to consider conduct
that is not the subject of the pleadings in determining the amount of punitive damages,
and if the pleadings are amended, it would have to state a cause of action for spoliation of
evidence as a distinct tort. But courts sometimes go to great lengths to support the jury's
efforts to deter suppression. See, e.g., Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 635 N.E.2d 331.
344 (Ohio 1994) (holding that punitive damages are appropriate in a case of intentional
alteration or destruction of medical records in malpractice action despite the fact, empha-
sized by the dissent, that a cause of action in spoilation had not been formally pleaded or
submitted in the jury's charge).
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result that would occur under reasonably complete evidence. Even a
suppressor of evidence can be in the right on the underlying claim;
indeed, given the variability of inferences, suppressed evidence might
actually be favorable to the suppressing party in the eyes of the trier
of fact. But without the missing evidence, the trier of fact is guessing.
The result in some cases will be changed; in others, not. The same
would be true if the missing evidence were presented, but the cases in
which the change in result would occur will surely not match exactly
the cases in which discounting changes the result. In other words,
discounting by the trier of fact is an epistemic substitute for the
missing evidence, one that is inherently inferior, to be used only when
and because necessary. Before embracing it, one must be sure that
better solutions are not available.
One application of this point that has been noted in previous lit-
erature is that in some cases the discounting might apply just as well
to either side of the dispute. That is, it might be impossible in a par-
ticular case to say whether the fact of omission counts against 7t or
against A. My rape hypothetical tends to conceal this possibility be-
cause there is little doubt in that case that the omission should
"count" against the prosecution. Perhaps the most likely candidate
for such "symmetric" discounting is the failure to call a neutral wit-
ness readily available to each side, especially in a civil case. In any
event, there will surely be such cases, and when they arise, no dis-
counting will be warranted.38 Yet some response to the incomplete-
ness of the evidence will often be appropriate. This is not only be-
cause of the greater confidence that further evidence would give the
trier of fact as to its decision, but also because the result could be af-
fected by the presentation of the missing evidence. In other words,
one consequence of incomplete substitutability is that the symmetric
discounting that occurs in ignorance of the exact content of the
missing evidence does not necessarily reflect the probative value of
the evidence if it were available to the trier of fact.39
38. See, e.g., State v. Brewer, 505 A.2d 774 (Me. 1985) (barring the use of adverse
inferences for failure to present evidence in the context of a case in which a missing wit-
ness appeared to be readily available to both sides and the tenor of his testimony could
not easily be guessed).
39. Professor Brilmayer suggests the possibility of dismissing a civil case based on
"naked statistical evidence" because such evidence is incomplete, even though the prob-
ability of the plaintiffs claim being true remains greater than P* after symmetric dis-
counting for the omission. Lea Brilmayer, Second-Order Evidence and Bayesian Logic,
66 B.U. L. REv. 673, 681-85 (1986). But she denies, or ignores, the possibility that insist-
ing on further evidence will change the result in such a case. See id. at 674-81. Thus, she
misleadingly concludes that
[t]he costs [of insisting on additional evidence] are justified by collateral values
about weight and quality of evidence, and not by improved accuracy in the lim-
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Cost conditions and incompleteness. Symmetrical discounting is
not inevitable, however. This can be seen by examining the cost con-
ditions under which an adverse inference is appropriate. By com-
paring these cost conditions with the more general conditions indica-
tive of unreasonable evidential incompleteness, one can further
demonstrate the need for alternative responses to incompleteness
and articulate a framework within which to analyze them.
Suppose that, from the public point of view, the amount or na-
ture of the controversy warrants the consideration of potentially
relevant evidence s if the cost of acquiring it does not exceed C*(E).
Often the cost of acquiring and presenting evidence will vary de-
pending upon who gathers and presents it. Call the cost to 7t of pre-
senting s C,,(s), and the cost to A CA(S). 4 ° If this evidence is not pre-
sented, under what cost conditions is it appropriate to conclude that
the evidence is unreasonably incomplete, and under what cost condi-
tions is it appropriate for the trier of fact to discount the other evi-
dence to reflect the incompleteness?
First, under what conditions will a reversible loss of evidence be
unreasonable? A reversible deficiency is unreasonable because the
significant but missing evidence is reasonably available to one or both
of the parties. Such cases can be divided into three distinct catego-
ries: (1) the missing evidence is reasonably available to Rt but not A,
i.e., C,,(s) < C*(s) but CA(S) > C*(s), (2) the missing evidence is rea-
sonably available to A but not 7t, i.e., Cr(6) > C*(s) but CA(S) < C*(6),
or (3) the missing evidence is reasonably available to both it and A,
i.e., Cr(E) < C*(6) and CA(s) < C*(s).4 ' On the other hand, an adverse
inference against a party properly arises only if the missing evidence
could be presented at reasonable cost by that party. Thus, an adverse
inference should arise against 7c only if the first of the three condi-
tions is met, and an adverse inference should arise against A only if
the second is met.4 2 But what about cases of the third type?
ited Bayesian sense.
Id. at 685.
40. These are the direct financial costs, inconvenience, and difficulty of obtaining
and presenting the evidence as well as the legitimately considered costs that presenting
the evidence would impose on third parties. Specifically not included is any estimate of
the "cost" to the party in terms of its effect upon the likelihood of winning the present
litigation.
41. It may also be reversibly incomplete if the cost of judicial acquisition of the evi-
dence, for example by judicial calling of witnesses, is less than C*(S). But in an adversar-
ial system that is not geared up for judicial investigations, we may reasonably assume that
judicial acquisition costs will be no smaller than the smaller of C,,(6) and CA(6).
42. See, e.g., 3 EDWARD J. DEVITT ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND
INSTRUCTIONS § 72.16 (4th ed. 1987) (setting forth civil jury instruction concerning miss-
ing evidence):
If a party fails to produce evidence which is under his control and reasonably
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When missing evidence is reasonably available to both parties,
thus creating a problem of symmetric discounting, one might draw
adverse inferences as to both parties, but what would be the point?
The solution that is suggested by some authorities is that the adverse
inference should be drawn against the party to whom the evidence is
relatively more accessible.43 But a party's decision whether to present
evidence will be affected by how much it helps that party and how
much it costs, not by the fact that it is more or less expensive for that
party to produce the evidence than it would be for an adverse party.'
So the suggested solution embraces a totally different theory. The
conspicuous explanation is that it attempts to secure the presentation
of the evidence at minimal cost, regardless of the inferences to be
drawn from the omission. Thus both truth-finding and efficiency are
supposed to be served, but not by rationally adjusting Pr(H). Since
determining Pr(H), and comparing it with P*, is the nominal role of
the trier of fact, the suggested solution may well be the right idea, but
it is employed in the wrong context.
Second, under what conditions of cost will an irreversible loss of
evidence be unreasonable? The loss of evidence is irreversible if and
only if, at the time when the issue is raised in court, C(s) > C*(s) and
CA(s) > C*(s); it is problematic only if at some earlier time at least
one of these conditions was not true and that situation has changed as
a consequence of faulty conduct by one or both parties.45 Under these
available to him and not reasonably available to the adverse party, then you may
infer that the evidence is unfavorable to the party who could have produced it
and did not.
Actually, there will be situations meeting the first condition in the text when, nonetheless,
an adverse inference against the 7t would be hostile to accuracy (and similarly as to ad-
verse inferences against the A under the second condition): Even though s may favor 7t, its
probative value may be low enough that 7t is unwilling to incur C(&) in order to present it.
43. See Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 121 (1893) (disapproving prosecution's
comment on defendant's failure to produce defendant's wife for possible identification,
but noting that failure to produce a competent witness "peculiarly available" to one side
raises a presumption that the testimony would be unfavorable to that side); 1 EDWARD J.
DEvITT ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 14.15 (4th ed. 1992)
(setting forth instruction for criminal trials that apparently contrasts "peculiarly avail-
able" with "equally available"); 3 DEvrr ET AL., supra note 42, § 72.15 (setting forth
similar instruction for civil cases). See also Friedman, supra note 35, at 1963 (endorsing
adverse inferences against the party who presumably was in the better position to pro-
duce the evidence).
44. See MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 264, at 463-64 (articulating the standard for
availability of the adverse inference in terms of one party's "exclusive control" over the
missing evidence).
45. Of course, it may not be impossible to retrieve the lost evidence in such a case;
either C,(e) or CA(e) could be high (higher than C*(e)) but not infinite. If a party's con-
duct is particularly egregious, the judge might be tempted to take steps designed to com-
pel the party to retrieve the evidence even at a cost greater than the C*(e) that would ap-
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conditions, however, it is reasonable to make an adverse inference
against one of the parties, the party at fault in causing the deficiency
to become irreversible, only when that party acted in bad faith, that
is, with the intent to deprive the tribunal of evidence. Only then is
there reason to believe that the evidence suppressed would have been
unfavorable to the suppressing party.46
Yet a party's negligent destruction of evidence, while not as seri-
ous as its intentional cousin, is still a real problem. And it can render
the evidence unreasonably incomplete even though no adverse infer-
ence is appropriate. The lack of probative value in the destruction
does not necessarily mean that the loss of evidence should be without
consequences. Such consequences are necessary in terms of protect-
ing the truth-finding function of the adjudicative process in the long
run.
Improper discounting. The previous paragraphs have identified
situations in which a legal response to incompleteness is appropriate,
but jury discounting is not. Jury discounting in such cases will be
beneficial, if it is, only by accident. Negligent destruction cases are
obvious examples. In other contexts, such as willful evidence de-
struction, jury discounting is an appropriate but inadequate response.
But it is important to note conversely the danger that jury discount-
ing will take place when no legal response to the incompleteness is
appropriate.
For example, the jury may think discounting is appropriate be-
cause they are not provided the information necessary to realize that
it is not. This may arise simply because the parties do not anticipate
the evidence about which the jury will suspect impropriety. In the
rape hypothetical presented earlier, the jury might be suspicious that
no fingerprint evidence was presented and be inclined to infer that
the prosecution has reason to believe that the defendant was never in
the complainant's home. The prosecution might be able to explain
this omission easily, in a way that does not suggest the defendant's
innocence, but it does not anticipate the jury's concern. As long as
trial procedures do not facilitate dialogue with the trier of fact in or-
der to clear up such matters, improper discounting can impair the ac-
curacy of adjudication.47
ply if the suppression had been less reprehensible. In other words, C*(E) might be consid-
ered to be a variable that depends on how the evidence came to be incomplete. In my
view, that is unwise. As will be developed in the following section, it is better to summa-
rily grant judgment against the party who committed such suppression than to force ex-
penditures not warranted by the nature of the controversy itself.
46. See MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 265, at 465.
47. In a recently published dialogue about juries, George Fisher, a former prosecu-
tor now teaching at Stanford, responded to a question about jury error with the following
pertinent anecdote:
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Implications. The inadequacies of any theory or practice that
would rely exclusively or predominantly on jury discounting to deal
with evidentiary incompleteness reflect the fact that there is a con-
cern distinct from making the best decision under uncertainty when a
decision must be made. There is the analytically prior question of
whether a decision on the merits (that is, as to whether Pr(H) is
greater than P*) should be made on the present state of the evi-
dence.4" The primary responsibility for addressing this question must
lie with the trial judge. And to the extent that steps taken by the trial
judge to address this concern are effective, the discounting response
is rendered unnecessary and potentially counter-productive.
IV. Implementing Judge-Centered Responses
If the judge is to be involved more directly in monitoring for
completeness of evidence, how should this be done? In other words,
once the judge determines that the evidence is unreasonably incom-
plete, so that a decision on the factual merits should not rationally be
made on the present state of the evidence, what judicial response is
optimal? There are several devices available to the trial judge for
dealing with deficiencies in the evidence. Putting them together in
the optimal way is a difficult problem of institutional design.
Reversible deficiencies. In the context of a reversible deficiency
in the evidence, the primary goal should be to obtain the missing evi-
dence for consideration by the trier of fact at minimal cost. Secon-
dary objectives would be to deprive a wrongdoer, if any, of the bene-
fit of the wrongdoing and to compensate the adverse party for any
costs imposed thereby. With these goals in mind, consider the prin-
Juries certainly can get the facts wrong. One of my colleagues, for example,
prosecuted a serial rapist. There were several identifications of the defendant,
but the jury still acquitted him. It apparently got stuck on the absence of any
evidence about the rapist's fingerprints on one victim's raincoat. Of course, you
generally don't get fingerprints from a raincoat, but a prosecutor constantly has
to be on the alert for the one thing that a jury might seize on to acquit a defen-
dant.
This is my paradigm of a wrong verdict: a decision to acquit based on non-
evidence in the face of a lot of direct evidence of guilt.
Juries on Trial, 52 STANFORD LAWYER 16, 17-18 (Spring 1998). For a theoretical treat-
ment emphasizing this kind of problem, see Dennis Lindley & Richard Eggleston, The
Problem of Missing Evidence, 99 LAw Q. REv. 86 (1983).
48. To return to the conventional model, Professor Kaye correctly noted: "The deci-
sion-theoretic analysis focuses on what actions should be taken under risk. It presumes
that action must be taken (a verdict must be returned), and it prescribes a rule for doing
so that minimizes the expected losses from erroneous verdicts." Kaye, supra note 19, at
669. Further, Kaye recognizes that preemption of such "action" by the trier of fact may
be necessary in at least some contexts on account of evidential incompleteness. See icL at
664 n.17.
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cipal tools that can be brought to bear.
The judge might initiate inquiry directly by calling and interro-
gating witnesses. But this solution is problematic: Rejection of this
manner of proof is the principal distinguishing feature of the adver-
sary system, with its emphasis on litigant autonomy; and even limited
use of such powers, though permissible under the rules of evidence, 4"
is rife with difficulties concerning the suggestion of judicial bias, es-
pecially in jury trials.5" It is also probable that such judicial inquiries,
in a system not designed for them as a regular part of the adjudica-
tion of disputes, will be inefficient solutions relative to responses that
act more passively by putting pressure on the parties to present a
complete package of evidence. To avoid such comparatively active
intervention, the common law has evolved two other principal ways
for the trial judge to handle incompleteness within the confines of the
same litigation, besides simply encouraging adverse inferences with
the use of jury instructions.
The more common of these is the use of exclusionary rules. I
have argued extensively elsewhere that the function of exclusionary
rules is often to encourage the presentation of probative evidence
presumably available to the party whose evidence is excluded, rather
than to prevent misdecision because the excluded evidence is some-
how tainted. 1 While both relatively passive and reasonably effective,
this device is not without its limitations and problematic implications.
If the probative value of the excluded evidence is largely independent
of the preferred evidence, or the excluded evidence is evidence that
the trier of fact reasonably expects would be presented in the ordi-
nary case, then exclusion is likely to operate in an arbitrary way, se-
verely distorting the inferences to be drawn by the trier of fact.52
Consequently, exclusionary responses have been invoked most com-
monly when the excluded evidence is epistemically redundant to, or
derivative of, the evidence in preference for which the exclusion op-
erates. Classic examples are the rules requiring that testimony be
given under oath and subject to cross-examination, as well as the
49. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 614,706.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Karnes, 531 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1976) (reversing convic-
tion when trial judge had called witnesses). See generally Stephen Saltzburg, The Unnec-
essarily Expanding Role of the Trial Judge, 64 VA. L. REV. 1 (1978) (emphasizing the im-
portance of judicial passivity).
51. See generally Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, supra note 27.
52. On the former problem, see, for example, State v. Langlet, 283 N.W.2d 330, 333
(Iowa 1979) (holding that even a spoliator may not "be deprived of his legal rights by the
exclusion of other and totally independent evidence"). On the latter problem, see Ste-
phen Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering Negative Inferences Associated
with the Absence of Evidence, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1011 (1978).
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original document rule and the hearsay rule.53 By modest extension,
exclusionary responses, at least those of a conditional character (E1 is
excluded if, but only if, E, is not introduced) can be useful when the
excluded evidence, though not itself redundant or derivative, is ren-
dered misleading or of little probative value without the preferred
evidence.54
Even expansive readings of the role of exclusionary rules in as-
suring evidential completeness will not cover anywhere near every
problem." So consider an alternative response suggested by the rape
hypothetical with which we began. It is to render a conclusive ruling
on a matter of fact affected by the incompleteness. This can take a
number of different forms, ranging from a rebuttable presumption
about the content of the missing evidence to a directed verdict, dis-
missal, or default on the whole of the case. Under my proposal, what
these devices have in common is that the judge, without involving the
jury at all, makes the determination about whether the evidence is
unreasonably incomplete and, upon a positive finding to that effect,
renders a preemptive determination of fact.56 Whether called a pre-
sumption, a directed verdict, a discovery sanction, or something else,
it should operate only after the party to be adversely affected has had
a reasonable opportunity to obtain and present the evidence in ques-
tion.
At first blush, it would seem that the preempted fact might be
evidentiary, such as the fact that the missing witness would have testi-
fied that the defendant ran the red light, or it might be ultimate, such
as the fact that the defendant ran a red light. But to employ a pre-
empted fact that is purely evidentiary is to invite artificiality in fact-
53. See Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, supra note 27, at 248-53,270-78.
54. This phenomenon is often mislabeled "conditional relevance." See generally
Dale A. Nance, Conditional Relevance Reinterpreted, 70 B.U. L. REv. 447 (1990); Richard
D. Friedman, Conditional Probative Value: Neoclassicism Without Myth, 93 MIcH. L.
REV. 439 (1994).
55. This is vividly illustrated by the case of United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909 (2d
Cir. 1993) (on remand from the well-known United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317 (1992)),
in which the hearsay rule, as interpreted, prevented defendant from introducing favorable
grand jury testimony of witnesses who were privileged not to testify because the govern-
ment did not grant the witnesses use immunity. The net effect was that the trier of fact
received neither the witnesses' live testimony nor their grand jury testimony, though both
were readily available. Interestingly, even if the defendant had prevailed in arguing for a
reading of FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) that would allow admission of the grand jury testi-
mony, the trial probably would have proceeded without the more thoroughly examined
trial testimony of these readily available witnesses.
56. To the extent that current doctrine invokes presumptions, the jury is generally
involved in the administration of the presumption by way of fact finding with regard to
the claims of evidence withholding, destruction, and so forth, unless of course the truth of
such claims is not reasonably disputable. See DESTRUCrION OF EVIDENCE, supra note 1,
§ 2.22. I reject such jury involvement for reasons articulated infra in Part V.
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finding. In a jury trial, for example, the jury might be told to assume
that a witness would testify that the defendant ran the red light. But
that proposition is indeterminate as far as the controversy being liti-
gated. What, for example, is the jury to assume in terms of the credi-
bility of the witness, or the confidence with which she would testify
concerning defendant's act? Absent information about such matters,
what significance is to be attributed to the assumed testimony? Be-
cause of such difficulties, it is best to make the preemptive ruling op-
erate at the level of an ultimate fact, an element of the claim or de-
fense. Such preemption leaves nothing, or at least very little, for the
jury to do that would be distorted by artificial assumptions.57
This device should be the remedy of choice for post-discovery
evidential incompleteness amenable to neither the judicial presenta-
tion of evidence nor the invocation of a preferential exclusionary
rule. It is aptly viewed as a component of the burden of production,
possibly through the medium of a presumption, and it does not rest
upon an inference as to the exact nature of the probative value of the
missing evidence, beyond the fact that it is probably significant in
some way. In this sense, it wears its artificial character on its sleeve:
It minimizes the temptation of an observer of the litigation to take
the result as reflecting what likely happened between the parties.58
The artificiality is entirely defensible in terms of protecting the tribu-
nal (judge and jury) from being put in the position of making a deci-
57. It does not, for example, require the court to instruct the jury that it is to take the
ultimate proposition in question to be certainly true. Rather, it simply removes that ele-
ment from the case as a proposition on which a formal finding must be made. Thus, if the
probability of that proposition's being true matters in deciding other elements of the case,
and other such elements are not also judicially foreclosed, the jury might attribute to the
foreclosed element a probability less than that required under the applicable burden of
persuasion. So the jury's deliberations with regard to the other elements remain unfet-
tered.
58. A partially apt analogy is the statute of limitation. Choosing not to decide the
merits of the specific allegations does not necessarily entail leaving the parties in the
status quo ante; even if the party who loses as a consequence of a refusal to decide the
factual merits of the claim is the party who bore the initial burden of persuasion and pro-
duction on the issue in question, that does not leave the parties in the status quo ante be-
cause res judicata would apply to prevent the loser from reasserting his or her barred
claim in subsequent litigation, and thus uncertainty about legal claims is reduced or elimi-
nated. As Professor Brilmayer noted, in the context of a decision to foreclose a plaintiff's
nakedly statistical claim because of evidential incompleteness,
the prejudice to future actions will result not from any factual finding about the
probability of guilt, but from the fact that a plaintiff only gets one bite at the ap-
ple. Having had one opportunity to present the case the plaintiff is barred even
if he or she later returns with better evidence.
See Brilmayer, supra note 39, at 685. On the other hand, one important point of dissimi-
larity from statutes of limitation is that the burden of production need not fall on the
plaintiff under the theory I advance here.
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sion on the basis of an unreasonably incomplete package of evidence.
And in jury cases, this mode of response shows appropriate respect to
the jury in its fact-finding role by not asking it to perform hypotheti-
cal inferences skewed by jury instructions creating irrelevant or pos-
sibly counterfactual assumptions.
This last reason illustrates why the recommended response need
not be characterized as "punitive." Rather, it can and should be un-
derstood as protective. It serves to protect the tribunal from being
put in the position of deciding very serious matters that are the sub-
ject of legal claims based on evidence that is unreasonably incom-
plete. 9 Moreover, the peremptory rulings endorsed here do not in-
volve court mandates to present evidence. Instead, the message they
give is that if such evidence is not introduced, which remains a legiti-
mate option of the burdened party, then that party may not seek a
favorable determination under the applicable burden of persuasion.'
It remains, however, to specify against whom the peremptory
ruling should operate. Given the primary goal of obtaining the
missing evidence at minimal cost, the burdened party should be the
party with better access to the missing evidence. As we saw earlier,
in many but not all cases this will also be the party who would be ex-
pected to present the evidence if it were favorable to that party.
However, in a case where attempted suppression has been incom-
pletely successful, as when business records have been partially de-
stroyed, so that the suppressor has superior access but dubious mo-
tives, the burden might have to rest upon the opponent, with inferior
access, for the sake of protecting the integrity of the evidence. Fi-
nally, in the not improbable case that neither party has discernibly
superior access, the burden should be imposed on the party bearing
the burden of persuasion on the issue.6'
59. This is not to deny that explicitly punitive measures may be appropriate in the
context of reversible deficiencies. Once again, without such measures, instrumentalist
litigants might see no reason not to take the chance that their suppression will go undis-
covered. A distinct tort claim is appropriate in cases of demonstrable bad faith. Sparse
case law concurs. See, e.g., Vivano v. CBS, Inc., 597 A.2d 543 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1991) (recognizing fraudulent concealment tort).
60. In analogous fashion, all manner of formal requirements on the enforceability of
wills or contracts cannot rightly be described as intended to "punish" parties who fail to
comply with them. Rather, these requirements limit the parties' access to the courts to
enforce the will or contract. Parties remain free, for example, to enter into and to per-
form oral contracts within the statute of frauds.
61. Cf. Joseph M. Livermore, Absent Evidence, 26 ARIZ. L. REv. 27, 36-37 (1984)
(arguing that adverse inferences should be allowed against the party with the "burden of
proof"). Although Professor Livermore did not consider the kind of judge-centered re-
sponse discussed here, it is interesting to note the limited nature of his approval of the use
of adverse inferences:
For a variety of reasons, the conclusion is inescapable that as a general rule such
Mar. 1998]
Predictability is, of course, to be valued, ceteris paribus. And
one might ask how the party initially burdened on the relevant ele-
ment will know that his opponent (or a co-party) has easier access to
certain evidence, so that the former is relieved of the burden to pro-
duce it. As a general matter that may be hard to know, and as a con-
sequence the initially burdened party is likely to act as if the burden
remains upon him. However, it should be possible to create "safe
harbors" for litigants in some contexts. For example, the costs of
production for a document ought to be presumed to be less for the
party who is in possession of the document, a result that is compati-
ble with the treatment of secondary evidence of documents under the
original document rule.62 By the same token, the costs of producing a
witness ought to be presumed to be less for a party closely identified,
by employment or family ties, with the witness.63 Further, provisions
could be worked out to allow notice and hearing prior to trial on is-
sues of comparative access.
One additional problem should be addressed. Suppose both par-
ties have superior access, each as to a different piece of important
missing evidence. How should this be handled? An orderly solution
is to treat them seriatim, according to the burden of production that
otherwise governs particular elements. At the end of plaintiff's case
in chief, if sufficiently important but missing evidence concerning an
element of the plaintiff's affirmative case (that is, an element upon
which the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion) is more readily
available to the plaintiff, then the preclusive consequences of that
burden should be imposed. Then, if other evidence as to such an
element is peculiarly available to the defendant, the burden resulting
therefrom should operate to preclude at that point a directed verdict
against the plaintiff solely on plausibility grounds, deferring resolu-
tion of the matter until defendant has had a chance to present the
missing evidence.' If no verdict is directed against the plaintiff, ei-
inferences are unsound. They may, however, be justified as a mechanism to in-
sure, in a limited number of instances, that certain evidence will be presented.
Requiring trial judges to address the inference in these terms is more likely to
improve factfinding not only because important evidence will more probably be
available but also because factually misleading inferences will be eliminated.
Id. at 40. But if adverse inferences only make sense as a mechanism to insure production,
then a more direct mechanism, such as the burden of production, should be used.
62. See FED. R. EvID. 1004(3) (excusing the use of the original when an opponent
with notice is in possession of the original).
63. It is understandable that an opponent might be reluctant to call such a witness, a
fact which helps to explain, though not justify, the traditional use of adverse inferences
against the party related to such a witness. See MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 264, at 463-
64 (noting that some uses of such inferences fall into this category rather than the cate-
gory of inferences from exclusive control of the missing evidence).
64. To this extent, I take issue with those cases concluding that withholding of evi-
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ther on incompleteness grounds or plausibility grounds, then, at the
close of defendant's case in chief, the court should resolve any re-
maining issue of incompleteness associated with defendant's superior
access to evidence related to the plaintiff's affirmative case; if such
evidence has been presented, the court proceeds to determine any
remaining issue preclusion on plausibility grounds against either
party on the elements of the plaintiff's case. This process is then re-
versed for consideration of any affirmative defenses in the case. Fi-
nally, if the case remains open, it would be submitted to the trier of
fact with confidence that adjudication will take place on the basis of
reasonably complete evidence.'
These procedural points serve to emphasize an important differ-
ence between my framework and the conventional understanding of
the burden of production. It is common fare to acknowledge that one
relevant factor in determining the allocation of the burden of produc-
tion is the relative access of the parties to evidence.' But this oper-
ates, as it were, wholesale: One cannot split the burden of production
between one party who has generally better access to evidence, or
who for other reasons should be assigned the burden of producing
evidence with respect to a particular element, and another person
who has better access only to particular evidence. By recognizing
two distinct components of the burden of production, my analysis al-
lows one to tailor the burden in a way that is not easily accommo-
dated under the conventional analysis.67
dence by the defendant cannot substitute for plaintiff's proof of a prima facie case. See
McCormick, supra note 14, § 264, at 188. This view is also commonly expressed in the
context of destruction of evidence (irreversible deficiencies), though there are more signs
of change on the point. See id., § 265, at 192-94.
65. Where the costs of producing the evidence ultimately come to rest is a separate
matter. In the partial destruction case, for example, the costs of reconstructing the evi-
dence should be borne by the suppressor. Similarly, in the presumably rare case in which
intentional suppression by one party has caused another to be the one with superior ac-
cess, the burdened party should be indemnified by the suppressor for reasonable costs
incurred in acquiring and presenting the evidence. This case will be rare because suppres-
sion typically indicates that the missing evidence would be favorable to an adverse party.
If so, an adverse party with reasonable access would have strong incentive to obtain and
present the evidence, so that no issue of the burden of production or indemnification
would arise. Nevertheless, such a case might occur if, for example, a pretrial hearing
brings the suppression to light, so that the opponent has an opportunity to request indem-
nification costs associated with evidence she would present anyway. Another example
would arise when the suppressor and the party in the next best position to obtain the evi-
dence are two parties on the same side of the litigation.
66. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 35, at 1965-67.
67. Under the conventional analysis, a rebuttable presumption might operate to shift
the burden of producing evidence as to a particular fact 4 to a party with particular access
to the evidence thereof, c. See icL at 1967-68. But such a presumption does not achieve
the result I have prescribed, even if it were administered entirely by the judge, because it
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Irreversible deficiencies by fault. The analysis is much the same
in the context of irreversible deficiencies, although our priorities
must be somewhat different. Top priority should go to eliminating
gains and losses from faulty destruction of evidence and otherwise
creating appropriate disincentives for the suppression of evidence.
Still, a secondary goal is to obtain the missing evidence for use in
court. This latter goal might seem inconsistent with the assumption
of an irreversible deficiency, but it remains a concern in the case by
virtue of the uncertainty that generally attends any determination
that the deficiency is irreversible. In other words, a judge who makes
a determination that the deficiency is irreversible on the basis of in-
formation supplied by the parties must acknowledge the possibility
that the evidence might still be reasonably accessible, so the judicial
response to such a determination should not create disincentives to
the production of the missing evidence.
As in the case of reversible deficiencies, exclusionary rules have
an important role in responding to suppression of evidence. Exam-
ples are not difficult to find: secondary evidence of the contents of a
document is excluded if the proponent has destroyed the original in
bad faith; and conversely, secondary evidence of the contents of an
original document is admitted if the opponent has destroyed the
original.68 Similarly, a proponent of hearsay is denied the use of ex-
ceptions conditioned upon unavailability of the declarant if the pro-
ponent has procured the unavailability;69 and conversely, hearsay is
admissible against a party who has procured the unavailability of the
declarant.7' But as these examples suggest, the scope of exclusionary
rules in dealing with suppression of evidence is limited.
Once again, the burden of production may be used to supple-
ment the exclusionary rules. The principal difference when address-
ing irreversible deficiencies is that one ought not, indeed one often
cannot, allocate the burden of production with regard to the missing
evidence based on superiority of access. Even if the evidence re-
mains accessible, but not at reasonable cost for either party (e.g.,
C,(c) > CA(s) > C*(s)), then allocating the burden so as to minimize
cost is self-defeating.7' Accordingly, one is left to allocate the burden
imposes only a burden to produce evidence relating to 4, not a burden to produce specifi-
cally evidence E. In the language of presumptions, if it must be used. my proposal in-
volves an entirely judicially administered, conclusive presumption about the affected ul-
timate fact against the party with better access to important but unpresented evidence.
68. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 1004(1).
69. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 804(a).
70. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
71. Of course, the court could be wrong in its cost estimates. And it is possible that a
judge would find the missing evidence to be irreversibly lost, with a probability greater
than .5 but less than 1, and that the judge might conclude that, while neither party proba-
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in order to deprive the wrongdoer of the potential benefits of the
wrongful conduct. In the unusual event that both sides are culpable
in the loss of the evidence, a comparative fault criterion is the best
that can be done. The conditional quality of the preemptive ruling,
by allowing the burdened party to produce the evidence in court,
hedges the court's bets concerning the relative cost and value of the
evidence. 2 In cases where neither party can rightly be said to be at
greater fault, once again the burden of production should fall upon
the party with the burden of persuasion on the affected issue. 3
In the extant case law there certainly are judicial responses
nearly as strong as that suggested here, at least with regard to inten-
tional destruction of evidence, or more precisely, intentional destruc-
tion of what is known to be evidence in order to prevent its use
against the destroyer.74 But one might well argue that it is inappro-
priate to impose such a draconian remedy when the evidential dam-
age is the consequence of mere negligence.75 Why, in particular,
bly has reasonable access, one party more probably has such access than the other.
72. When the burdened party is unable to produce the missing evidence, there is the
potential for fabricated claims by an opponent. For example, suppose the plaintiff enters
into an (integrated) written contract to sell widgets to the defendant. Prior to litigation,
the defendant destroys the only original writing with the intention of reneging on the deal.
The original, as evidenced by a duplicate, specifies a price of $100 per widget, the market
price at the time of contracting. The plaintiff, confident that he can prove faulty destruc-
tion by the defendant, and knowing of the use of burdens of production against destroy-
ers, alleges and is prepared to testify that the contract provided for a price of $1,000 per
widget. To be sure, problems of this type can arise just as well under current practices,
since secondary evidence of the contents of the original would be inadmissible at trial on
behalf of the defendant under FED. R. EVID. 1002, 1003(1) and 1004(1). They will need
to be controlled under rules such as those requiring good faith in pleadings, see, e.g., FED.
R. Civ. P. 11, or by application of the traditional presumption that the remedy extend
only to a claim that is most plausibly favorable to the non-suppressing party, see, e.g.,
Armory v. Delamirie, 1 Starnge 505 (K.B. 1722) (holding that damages for conversion of
jewel not produced in court by defendant should be estimated according to its highest
plausible value).
73. A possible exception would be when the court is also quite sure that the loss is
irreversible. In such an unusual case, the court should treat the loss of the evidence in the
same manner as faultless losses, that is, by ignoring it; by hypothesis, the evidence will not
be forthcoming by imposing a burden of production, and neither party is more responsible
for the situation.
74. The main practical difference from my suggestions is that the conventional doc-
trines give responsibility to the jury to determine whether the intentional destruction has
occurred. See DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 2.18, at 51, and 1997 supp. at
47 (and cases cited therein). See also infra Part V.
75. Again, case law is quite diverse, but the present proposal, aside from largely re-
moving the jury from its role in handling incompleteness, entails a stronger response than
is typically available for negligent destruction. For example, extant law commonly in-
vokes a presumption shifting the burden of production to the party most responsible for
the loss of evidence, but generally the resulting production burden may be satisfied or cir-
cumvented by presenting other evidence relating to the same mediate or ultimate issue.
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should negligence be treated the same as intentional withholding or
destruction? Would it not be better, at least in civil cases, to use a
more modest response to negligence, such as the monetized damages
remedy endorsed earlier with regard to non-party negligence?76
The answer to these questions is straightforward. Intentional
suppression of evidence is treated differentially under my proposal
for the simple reason that my scheme does not preclude punitive re-
sponses, including punitive damages and criminal punishment.'
And, in the context of negligence, where the criminal law rarely
treads, and where punitive damages will properly not be allowed, it is
better to invoke procedural consequences in the main litigation,
thereby saving the considerable costs, public and private, of separate
or more complicated litigation and avoiding the serious difficulty of
estimating actual damages.78 Moreover, mere monetary compensa-
tion to the adversely affected party does not account for the of-
fender's breach of duty to the tribunal itself. At the risk of oversim-
plification, the moral intuition involved here is that one's negligent
interference with legitimate fact finding should result in one's losing
the case, whereas intentional interference should result in that and
more.
Special considerations for criminal cases. The foregoing argu-
ments apply not only to civil parties but also when the adversely af-
fected party is the prosecution in a criminal case. My proposal ex-
pands the circumstances in which a preemptive remedy is available to
the defense, but recourse to such a remedy in appropriate cases is less
See supra note 67. To be sure, sometimes courts also shift the burden of persuasion on
the issue. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that
negligent destruction of evidence shifts burdens of production and persuasion to defen-
dant). And a recent article endorses shifting the persuasion burden. See Porat & Stein,
supra note 30, at 1941-60. Putting aside the relatively modest impact that persuasion bur-
den shifting is likely to have in many cases, this approach generates an unjustifiable
asymmetry: Shifting the persuasion burden is not viable when the party who is responsible
for the loss of the evidence happens to be the person bearing the burden anyway. Conse-
quently, this remedy is of little value when evidence is destroyed by plaintiffs, who are,
therefore, arbitrarily preferred by this approach.
76. This is the principal response preferred by Porat & Stein. See supra notes 30-31.
and accompanying text.
77. In civil cases, a punitive civil claim or counter-claim could be allowed in the prin-
cipal litigation, and such a claim might proceed on its own even if the judge terminates the
principal claim summarily against the destroyer. The punitive claim might be adjudicated
before the judge or submitted to a jury; efficient administration would suggest it should be
the judge at least whenever the jury is not otherwise involved in determining the effect of
the evidential incompleteness.
78. On this point, I agree with Professor Friedman. See Friedman, supra note 35, at
1979-80 (arguing that remedies "intrinsic" to the litigation of the primary claim are ade-
quate and more efficient remedies in most cases than a distinct cause of action in tort).
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of a change in the criminal arena.79 To be sure, one might argue that
the judiciary has less authority to second guess the investigative deci-
sions made by the executive branch of government than those made
by private civil parties. Separation of powers concerns can be cited.
On the other hand, the importance of evidential completeness is at its
height in the context of criminal trials, and the modest supervision
entailed by the need to justify some prosecutorial choices is a small
price to pay, one not infrequently paid under present law.8"
Moreover, one must keep in mind the comparative nature of the
institutional choice that is to be made here. That is, we are choosing
among three main alternatives: First, a system in which the defendant
is not allowed to invoke an argument about evidential incomplete-
ness, either to the judge or the jury; second, a system like the one we
have now, in which the defendant is allowed to invoke such an argu-
ment before the trier of fact, thus requiring the prosecution to ex-
plain or excuse its actions before a jury or risk acquittal; and third, a
system like the one I propose, in which such arguments must be made
to the trial court or risk dismissal. Unless one is prepared to opt for
the first alternative, and few would, considerations of institutional
competence favor the third, while the separation of powers issue is
largely beside the point.8"
On the other hand, the principle of holding the government to
79. Under present law, the usual, if inadequate, remedy for even intentional suppres-
sion by the prosecution, when discovered after trial, is retrial with the evidence available
for use by the defense, and merely negligent destruction of evidence rarely produces ad-
verse consequences for the prosecution. See, e.g., State v. Langlet, 283 N.W.2d 330 (Iowa
1979). But if the prosecution refuses to make potentially exculpatory evidence available
to the defense for use at trial, or if the evidence is destroyed in bad faith so that it cannot
be made available to the defense, there can be little doubt that dismissal is an appropriate
remedy, perhaps the only acceptable one. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928
(9th Cir. 1993) (holding that appropriate remedy in bad faith destruction case is dismissal
of the indictment and specifically rejecting, in the context of the case, a government pro-
posal to submit the matter to the jury).
80. See cases cited supra note 25. See also, e.g., United States v. Bahadar, 954 F.2d
821 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing circumstances under which a prosecutorial decision not to
grant use immunity to potential defense witnesses may be countered by a court deciding
that if the prosecution does not grant such immunity the indictment must be dismissed).
81. Whether one chooses the second or the third alternative, the practical limit of the
supervisory authority of the judge and jury is to preclude a judgment to which the prose-
cution would otherwise be entitled. As previously emphasized in the text, neither the
jury, nor under my proposal the judge, assumes the authority to order the prosecution to
undertake particular investigations or to present particular evidence. Under my ap-
proach, the judge acts only to limit the access of the executive branch to the courts, a
principle long recognized as within the constitutional authority of the courts. Moreover, a
judge can be expected to give more consistent effect to legal norms limiting the affirma-
tive duty of the government to avoid irreversible losses of evidence. With regard to such
affirmative duties, see supra note 21.
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proof of its case, combined with the superior resources generally
available to the prosecution, counsel against shifting any kind of
proof burden to the accused with regard to the elements of the of-
fense when the sole reason to do so is efficiency. In other words,
when the missing evidence is reasonably available to both prosecu-
tion and defense, the burden of producing that evidence should re-
main on the prosecution even if the court determines that Ct(s) >
CA(6). Moreover, even if the burden is rightly shifted to the accused
because the evidence is reasonably available to the defense but not to
the prosecution, i.e. C,(6) > C*(s) but CA(&) < C*(s), or because the
defendant was at greater fault in the irreversible loss of evidence, the
special concern that the law properly accords the accused rules out
what I have called the remedy of choice. Issue preclusion would
surely implicate, if not violate, the constitutional guarantee of a jury
trial, for it would present too easily the possibility of directed verdicts
of guilt.8" Even if the defendant consents to a bench trial, the defen-
dant has a constitutional right not to be convicted unless the evidence
establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet issue preclusion
against the defendant would be unnecessary and thus pointless unless
the evidence, after taking any intentional suppression into account,
left Pr(H) less than or equal to P.8'3 Consequently, a retreat to other
responses seems unavoidable. The obvious choice is to involve the
jury by way of missing evidence instructions. This option is explored
in the following section.
V. The Continuing Role of Jury-Centered Responses
Despite the serious deficiencies in relying on adverse inferences
and arguments before the trier of fact, the judicially administered is-
sue-preclusive remedies that I advocate here will seem too extreme
to some. Moreover, I have already acknowledged a major qualifica-
82. See, e.g., United States v. Bosch, 505 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that trial
judge may not effectively direct a verdict against the accused even when defense counsel
admits the elements of the offense). A not very convincing argument can be made that
the defendant "waives"-more precisely, forfeits-his constitutional right to a jury trial
by destroying evidence, at least when done intentionally. Cf United States v. Thevis. 665
F.2d 616, 630-31 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that defendant waived confrontation rights by
murdering witness before trial, thus rendering cross-examination impossible). But there
is a big difference between holding that the defendant's misconduct with regard to evi-
dence permits introduction, before the jury, of evidence that would otherwise be inadmis-
sible, and holding that such misconduct forfeits trial by jury itself.
83. Conviction might still be constitutional in such a case if the constitutionally re-
quired level of proof, beyond reasonable doubt, were construed to allow adjustments of
P* to reflect the comparative access to evidence or comparative fault in its loss. As will
be suggested in the following section, this may be acceptable for modest adjustments of
P*.
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tion on the use of such remedies. If, because of special concerns, we
are to involve the trier of fact in regard to evidential damage attrib-
utable to criminal defendants, it is natural to ask whether there are
other special circumstances in which we can at least "get by" in this
manner.
There are three distinct ways this might occur. First, taking issue
preclusion as the appropriate remedy, the jury could be involved by
deciding the facts that determine the issue preclusion. Second, re-
jecting issue preclusion, the jury could continue to perform the tradi-
tional rule of discounting the evidence on the underlying claim.
Third, the jury could be involved by allowing it to have a role in fix-
ing the standard under the burden of persuasion. In the following
paragraphs, I reject the first alternative outright and give a very
qualified and limited endorsement of the second and third alterna-
tives.
Conclusive presumptions and jury involvement. In principle, one
could instruct the jury to address the issue of incompleteness sepa-
rately. Thus, the jury would be instructed to make a determination of
unreasonable incompleteness as such and, if necessary, to render a
verdict predicated upon such a determination without getting to the
question of whether the burden of persuasion has been satisfied on
the underlying claim. This amounts to using a conclusive presump-
tion with the jury deciding whether the predicate conditions for the
presumption have been met. While it shares many features of con-
ventional responses, there are several reasons to reject such an ap-
proach.
First, it rests upon the same analytical confusion that attends so
much of presumption law, the idea that the jury is to decide the facts
that determine the allocation of the burden of production.84 Absent a
powerful argument for jury involvement, the judiciary should retain
its proper role of allocating the burden, within any applicable legisla-
tive constraints. Second, the suggested approach severely compli-
cates the role of the jury and the jury instructions that explain that
role. We should be doing everything possible to move in exactly the
opposite direction, allowing juries to focus on the merits of well-
presented claims. Third, the nature, effectiveness, and costs of dis-
covery mechanisms, evidentiary privileges, and the other factors that
affect decisions of counsel with regard to evidence within the context
of litigation are often matters well beyond the understanding of lay
84. See Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions in Civil Cases Considered, 66 IowA L. REV.
843, 849-55, 860-62 (1981) (arguing that the traditional roles of the legislature and judici-
ary in assigning the burdens of persuasion and production are obscured by the label "pre-
sumption," with the result that the jury is mistakenly thought to have a role in deciding
facts antecedent to the burden allocation decision).
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jurors. Fourth, the involvement of counsel signals a different set of
concerns having to do with the integrity of the bar, concerns that it is
appropriate for the judiciary to monitor more directly than by sub-
mitting the issue to the trier of fact.
Litigative and non-litigative incompleteness: determining the le-
gitimate scope of jury discounting. But what about jury involvement
that takes the form of drawing appropriate factual inferences neces-
sary to perform the jury's traditional and proper role of deciding
whether Pr(H) > P*? In Part III, we saw that there are reasons to be
skeptical. In the following paragraphs, I explore the question of
whether these objections can be overcome in some practically speci-
fiable categories of cases.
Take an example that is far removed from the rape hypothetical
that motivated the foregoing discussion. Suppose testimony is given
that a person involved in an automobile accident fled the scene im-
mediately after the crash. This standard example of what is often
called an "admission by conduct" evidences a consciousness of liabil-
ity, but it does so only to the extent that the evidenced flight is an at-
tempt to destroy evidence that would have existed had the motorist
waited around for the police to arrive. Under current practice, in a
civil case against the fleeing motorist, if evidence were offered to
show that he fled the scene, that evidence would be admissible on the
question of whether the fleeing motorist was negligent in causing the
crash. Generally speaking, such evidence, and the excuses likely to
be offered in explanation of the flight, would be readily comprehen-
sible to a lay jury hearing the case. Symmetric discounting is not a
problem, and incentive issues are muted by the motorist's probable
spontaneity of action. Moreover, such evidence could be admissible
for other reasons, such as to prove the identity of the motorist who
caused the accident rather than to establish negligence. It would ap-
pear that the evidence of flight is simply too close temporally and
causally to the litigated events to allow the judge to preempt jury
consideration. For these reasons, a judicial determination of whether
the defendant intentionally suppressed evidence by his flight might
seem to be inappropriate in some cases."
If you are inclined to accept this conclusion then the practical
problem is to sort such cases from those in which a judge-centered re-
sponse is optimal. To give the difference a name, one that speaks to
the paradigms under discussion, I shall refer to a distinction between
85. The same would be true in an analogous criminal prosecution for reckless driv-
ing. I have used an example from the civil litigation context because, as indicated in the
previous section, suppression of evidence by the accused in a criminal context calls for a
jury-centered response even if the special circumstances present in the flight hypothetical
are not present.
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litigative incompleteness and non-litigative incompleteness, the for-
mer being the kind that might still be properly assigned to the judge
and the latter being the kind properly assigned to the trier of fact,
which I will simply call the jury. One approach to this problem would
be to allow the judge to decide ad hoc whether each particular prob-
lem of unreasonable incompleteness is best suited to a judge-
centered response or a jury-centered response. De facto, that is the
system we have now, and for obvious reasons it usually results in the
problem being thrown to the jury. I want to explore, therefore,
whether a more rule-governed system of allocation-one that would
protect the proper role of the judiciary-is possible.86
The flight hypothetical isolates two factors, each one of which
might form the basis of the distinction we are trying to articulate.
One possibility is that it is the involvement of legal counsel in the
making of decisions with regard to evidence that signals the most im-
portant difference. That is the point at which the trial judge assumes
a distinct comparative advantage in evaluating the significance of
missing evidence. Further, involvement of counsel is a convenient
point to mark off the litigated events from the events of litigation.
Thus, one approach is to opt for a jury-centered solution when the
advice of counsel is not implicated.
The second possibility would be to let the jury handle the in-
completeness issue whenever significant aspects of the information
showing the possibility of unreasonable incompleteness-the eviden-
tial misconduct evidence-would be admissible anyway, despite the
issue foreclosure that might attend a judicial response. For example,
under this approach, if evidence of the motorist's flight is admissible
to counter the motorist's claim of his physical injury, despite judicial
foreclosure of the question of the motorist's negligence in driving
while intoxicated-important evidence of which was lost by the in-
ability to conduct a timely sobriety test, then the issue of negligence
would be submitted to the jury and the flight evidence would be ad-
missible as well for the purpose of showing consciousness of the ad-
verse nature of the intoxication evidence destroyed by the flight.87
86. I realize that some will resist the idea of rules for the control of evidence matters,
and I have much sympathy for that view. One can also think of my proposed norms, here
and elsewhere in the paper, as guidelines for the exercise of judicial discretion. I suspect,
however, that trial judges may need more encouragement than that approach might en-
tail.
87. The usual argument for admitting evidence of flight is that it shows a conscious-
ness of wrongdoing, an inference about which commentators are often and rightly skepti-
cal. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 263, at 462-63. Under the approach dis-
cussed in the text, courts would have to be somewhat more discerning in identifying the
basis for admitting such evidence. To the extent that evidence of flight is offered not as
evidence of the defendant's physical condition after the collision, but rather as evidence
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The virtue of this approach is that it accepts as inevitable the atten-
tion that will be given by the jury to evidential deficiency and thus
avoids inconsistency between judge and jury decisions about incom-
pleteness as well as the confusion and potential ineffectiveness of
limiting instructions. The corresponding difficulty with this option is
that sometimes the jury would be considering cases for which it does
not have the best available institutional competence or remedial re-
sources.
88
Obviously, there are two additional options that can be formed
by combining the first two. One can eschew judge-centered re-
sponses if either factor is present, or one can do so only if both factors
are present. The former combination amplifies the vices of the sec-
ond single-factor approach, while the latter minimizes them. For that
reason, if we are to go down this path at all, the optimal approach
employs the jury to deal with incompleteness only if both of the first
two conditions are satisfied, that is, only when (the trial judge finds
of consciousness of the adverse nature of the evidence against the accused in the absence
of flight, the real issue is destruction of evidence and the consequences that are to follow
therefrom. If so, then the condition stated in the text might not be satisfied. In such a
case, satisfaction of the condition would depend on whether there exists a legitimate in-
ference through consciousness of wrongdoing that is meaningfully distinguishable from an
inference through consciousness of the adverse nature of the potential evidence. I think
not. On the other hand, most flight cases are criminal cases, see id. at 463, as to which
these distinctions will matter little. See supra note 85.
Similar problems arise in connection with unsuccessful attempts to suppress evi-
dence. The present analysis does not speak directly to such cases, since by hypothesis the
trier of fact is not deprived of the evidence in question. Such evidence is often admitted
as showing consciousness of wrongdoing, despite the fact that such evidence cannot be
introduced on the theory that it shows something about the content of the evidence
sought to be suppressed. Careful analysis reveals that such evidence is offered to show
that the suppressor is a bad person, and for the possible propensity inference to be drawn
therefrom, and as such should not be admitted under conventional analysis. See
MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 265, at 465 (expressing doubt about the wisdom of such
admissions, and commenting, "The litigant who would not like to have a stronger case
must indeed be a rarity. It may well be that the real underpinning of the rule of admissi-
bility is a desire to impose swift punishment, with a certain poetic justice, rather than con-
cern over niceties of proof."). Of course, the analysis is different if the suppressor testi-
fies; in that case, the evidence of the suppressing act might be admissible impeachment
evidence reflecting a general propensity to be dishonest. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 608(b).
88. It is, of course, true that such problems of jury background are often handled in
trials by the use of expert testimony. One can imagine attorneys being employed as ex-
pert witnesses to explain the economics of litigation for the jury. But three factors coun-
sel against such an approach in this context. First, such testimony would amplify the dis-
traction already inherent in having the jury evaluate litigative behavior rather than the
underlying claims. Second, it is inefficient to employ experts of this particular type when
an expert in litigation is readily available in the person of the trial judge. And third.
whether or not expert witnesses are involved, such inquiries may involve strategic consid-
erations that implicate exclusionary rules the point of which would be lost or undermined
if explained to the jury.
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that) a party's actions causing unreasonable incompleteness were in-
dependent of legal counsel and evidence of such actions would be
admissible independent of completeness concerns. This option has
the advantage of limiting most strongly the cases in which the jury at-
tends to completeness issues.
Because of the first condition, a preliminary issue that the trial
court would need to resolve in order to choose whether or not to
submit the consideration of evidential incompleteness to the jury is
whether the failure to present the evidence in question is attributable
to decisions or advice of counsel. While obtaining the information
necessary to make this determination might not be technically re-
sistible on grounds of attorney-client privilege, such investigations
into confidential communications should not be undertaken lightly.
Fortunately, there are some easily administrable rules of thumb that
would suffice to help the trial judge in the sorting process.
Most importantly, if by the time of trial the incompleteness of
the evidence is found to be reversible, then the incompleteness very
likely should be considered litigative. That is, once the facts are dis-
cerned that show the evidence to be reasonably available to a party,
the failure of that party to present the evidence is likely the result of
legal advice. It is, of course, possible that the client might act to con-
ceal evidence without the knowledge of the attorney, but if so the
onus of arguing such is legitimately placed upon the attorney. It
would be reasonable, therefore, for the trial judge to employ a rebut-
table or even conclusive presumption that a reversible deficiency, re-
sponsibility for which is still attributable to a party after consulting
legal counsel, is the kind of incompleteness that should be evaluated
and acted upon by the trial judge without the intervention of a jury.
For practical purposes, what this means is that consideration of the
problem of evidential incompleteness would be submitted to the jury
only when a party's faulty conduct before consulting an attorney has
caused irreversible incompleteness of the evidence. 9
Not surprisingly, additional rules of thumb would be necessary
and presumably would evolve in implementing this scheme. For ex-
ample, the question would surely arise whether a party with perma-
89. One might want to allow the presumption to be rebutted when the attorney is
willing to break ranks with the client and inform the court that the client is, or may be,
withholding available evidence against the advice of counsel, or that the client has, or may
have, destroyed previously available evidence without the attorney's encouragement or
approval. In order to discourage attorneys from routinely and dishonestly disavowing any
knowledge of or participation in a decision not to present evidence or to destroy it, the
attorney might be required, for example, to either (1) explain to the court why the attor-
ney believes the client has reasonable access to the missing evidence or has rendered such
evidence unavailable, or (2) state under oath subject to penalty of perjury that he has no
reason to believe that.
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nently retained or in-house counsel should be viewed as having con-
sulted with an attorney from the moment of the actions that form the
basis of the underlying claim. I think that question should be an-
swered affirmatively, employing either a rebuttable or conclusive
presumption to that effect. Similarly, conduct of police and investiga-
tive officials prior to the explicit involvement of prosecuting attor-
neys arguably poses the same kinds of inferential difficulties dis-
cussed above and is likely to be significantly affected by the ongoing
relationship between the police and prosecutors. Thus, evidential de-
ficiency should be assigned to the judge for an appropriate response
if it is attributable to the conduct of police officers or other investiga-
tive officials.'
Now, one can certainly question whether the benefits to be de-
rived from leaving to the jury issues of non-litigative incompleteness
-those meeting both conditions discussed above-are worth the
considerable complexities that are introduced in order to do so. I am
quite skeptical about this, but I have tried to state the case as well as I
can. Even in the fleeing motorist case, there is little to fear in the
trial court's instructing the jury to consider evidence of flight only as
to those issues not judicially foreclosed. Nevertheless, assuming that
we are going to allow for such exceptional cases to be assigned to the
jury, we would still need to address the question of how the jury
should go about its task.
The use and misuse of missing evidence instructions. In the con-
text of non-litigative incompleteness, in what way should the trial
judge frame the issue for the jury? The answer depends on whether
the possibly unreasonable incompleteness is the result of bad faith or
of negligence. Consider the matter in regard to bad faith suppres-
sion.
In the first place, when a jury instruction explicitly or implicitly
calls for the jury to make a finding concerning the (un)availability of
the evidence, it is inviting a particular kind of inferential error. It is
inviting the jury to treat as true a proposition that is only probable or,
conversely, to treat as false a proposition that is only improbable. Of
90. A determination by the judge favorable to the defendant will end the prosecu-
tion, at least as to any count significantly affected by the missing evidence. On the other
hand, reasonable minds could disagree about the proper approach given a determination
favorable to the government. The approach that I favor is to preclude the defendant from
raising the issue before the jury. Of course, the prosecution would still have to show the
defendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (Such preclusion is probably no more suspect
constitutionally than precluding a defendant's argument on (or denying a jury instruction
with respect to) an affirmative defense when the judge determines that there is insuffi-
cient evidence to support it.) Alternatively, defendant might be given a second bite of the
apple by being able to pursue the claim of evidential incompleteness before the jury. per-
haps subject to judicial comment as to the results of the peremptory motion.
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course, the law often engages in such "fictions" in the determination
of cases by making remedial consequences turn on findings of that
sort about the ultimate propositions or elements of a cause of action,
and it does so for good reason.9 Indeed, my proposal entails such
findings by the trial judge with regard to litigative incompleteness.'
But unless encouraged or compelled to do so by poorly crafted in-
structions, reasonable jurors would not extend this kind of "as if"
analysis to the inference process antecedent to the ultimate proposi-
tions in the case. Thus, a reasonable juror will take into account the
mere possibility that the evidence is reasonably available, even if it is
more probable than not that it is unavailable.93 Conversely, a reason-
able juror will not take availability as certain just because it is more
probable than not, yet requiring a finding encourages such thinking.
Moreover, this kind of artificiality is amplified if the jury instruction
creates a presumption that the jury is told to administer by deciding if
the party burdened thereby has superior access to evidence or has
presented an adequate explanation for its absence.'
These inferential difficulties can be avoided by careful drafting
of the instruction, avoiding the language of presumptions: If an in-
struction is to be used at all, the jury should be told simply that, in
deciding whether the burden of persuasion has been satisfied, it may
take into account circumstances suggesting that evidence available
only to one side has not been presented because of that party's
awareness that the evidence would be unfavorable, or-much more
likely case-that for similar reasons evidence has been intentionally
rendered no longer reasonably available.95
91. See Kaye, supra note 5.
92. In addition, the trial judge's determination of whether the possibly unreasonable
incompleteness is litigative or non-litigative affects the admissibility of evidence and to
that extent is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a).
93. This is a point that is ignored all too often, as is made plain by the history of the
doctrine of conditional relevance. See generally Nance, supra note 54. I do not mean to
imply that jurors do not use, at least implicitly, conditional probabilities, such as the prob-
ability that the defendant committed the crime assuming that testimony placing him at the
scene is accurate. However, in such uses, to the extent the jurors attend explicitly to a
conditional probability, they know that it is hypothetical and eventually adjust for that
fact.
94. Cf. RONALD J. ALLEN, ET AL., EVIDENCE 856, 860 (2d ed. 1997) (arguing that in
regard to presumptions generally, it is better to have the judge decide the predicate facts
that activate the presumption).
95. One might wonder why such a weak instruction would be needed. After all, does
it not just tell the jury to infer what they would rationally infer anyway? The answer to
that is that it may be necessary to avoid a negative inference by the jury to the effect the
jury is not allowed to consider the issue of missing evidence. Put conversely, the jury
might well think that they are to consider only evidence presented to them. Indeed some
jury instructions say as much:
The law does not require any party to call as witnesses all persons who may have
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It might appear that such an instruction would be inappropriate
in negligent destruction of evidence cases. After all, one point of our
earlier discussion is that such negligence is not properly reflected in
the jury's determination of Pr(H). But there is another way to look
at the matter. It is addressed in the following section.
Adjustments of the burden of persuasion. In a recent essay,
Richard Friedman has suggested that the standard of proof, our P*,
might be adjusted to reflect a party's conduct in causing damage to
the evidence.96 The idea would be that if a party has wrongfully sup-
pressed evidence, P* would be raised or lowered to reflect that fact.
Returning to the decision theoretic-model, it is clear that the reason
we might do this is because of a lowered concern about the disutility
of a factually erroneous decision against a person at fault in sup-
pressing evidence. Friedman describes this proposal as appropriate
when evidence is damaged in an "egregious" manner. He is not clear
about who would do the adjustment of P* in a jury trial, judge or
jury. But in keeping with the conventional understanding, presuma-
bly it would be the judge.
Professor Friedman recognizes one problem with this idea: the
possibility of a form of double counting should the trier of fact use
the fact of suppression in determining Pr(H) when the trier of law (or
perhaps the trier of fact) is also using the suppression in fixing P*.
Indeed, judicial adjustment of P* would have to be communicated to
the jury in a comprehensible way, for they would surely wonder at
being told, for example, that the plaintiff wins in this case upon es-
tablishing that Pr(H) > .4. Explaining this in terms of an adjustment
that the judge has made on account of egregious conduct by a party
in suppressing evidence is sure to invite double counting, and so the
judge will have to take the likelihood of such double counting into
account in determining the appropriate adjustment. This is liable to
become an extremely difficult matter. Of course, these problems be-
come less intractable if the same decision-maker is responsible for
both the adjustment of P* and the determination of Pr(H), since the
decision-maker's own rationality will help to guard against double
counting. Thus, Friedman's approach makes more sense in bench
trials or in trials for which the jury has at least some role in the de-
termination of P*.
been present at any time or place involved in the case, or who may appear to
have some knowledge of the matters in issue at this trial. Nor does the law re-
quire any party to produce as exhibits all papers and things mentioned in the
evidence in the case.
3 DEVITr ET AL., supra note 42, § 73.11.
96. See Friedman, supra note 35 , at 1971-72. See also Friedman, supra note 7. at
279.
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But that introduces another problem. Such an adjustment of P*
by the jury seems to be exactly what we commonly affirm is not sup-
posed to happen. In particular, the message that we routinely attrib-
ute to rules like Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) is that bad acts dis-
tinct from the subject claim are generally not to be admitted, in part
because of the risk that the jury will adjust P* accordingly.' While
this particular problem does not come within the literal prohibition of
Rule 404(b), there is still a serious risk of a kind of prejudice that is
ordinarily considered unfair.9" For that reason, adjusting P* should
play at most a limited role in dealing with evidential incompleteness.
Such a role may be useful, for example, in the context of non-
litigative (and therefore very probably irreversible) incompleteness,
if it is assigned to the jury for an appropriate response. In particular,
a party's negligent destruction of evidence will not ordinarily warrant
discounting Pr(H), since mere negligence does not indicate an
awareness that the evidence would have been unfavorable to the
negligent party. On the other hand, negligence may be the basis of a
modest adjustment of P*. Given the usually vague formulations of
the standard of persuasion, it is not implausible to imagine a trier of
fact making such an adjustment within the law's framework. 9 Thus,
contrary to Professor Friedman, I conclude that this particular tool is
most valuable for dealing with those residual cases of non-litigative
incompleteness where the party's conduct is not egregious.
Special considerations for criminal cases. The remaining issue,
left over from Part IV, is how to deal with litigative incompleteness
when the adversely affected party, under the peremptory ruling ap-
proach generally preferred, would be the accused. Here the issue
should not be taken from the trier of fact, and conviction should not
be imposed by the trier of fact unless Pr(H) > P*. As with non-
litigative incompleteness, the appropriate response would be to allow
the prosecution to argue before the jury for an adverse inference
against the accused and to allow the parties to present to the jury in-
formation relevant and otherwise admissible in order to support or
oppose this inference.
That does not mean, however, that the comparative expertise of
the trial judge should be ignored completely. An appropriate com-
97. See Lempert, supra note 11, at 1132-41.
98. Since the jury is not being asked to infer the litigant's substantive wrongdoing
from his or her evidentiary wrongdoing, the propensity inference prohibition of Rule
404(b) is not literally invoked. But this is only because there is a more extreme form of
what is conventionally considered prejudice, directly inviting the jury to adjust the stan-
dard of persuasion because of the party's distinct wrongdoing. It is largely to avoid the
latter adjustments that we prohibit propensity arguments.
99. For example, this might be a ground for jurors' adjusting P* in a routine civil case
to be less than .5. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
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promise, in cases where the incompleteness is properly attributable to
advice of defense counsel, would be to allow the trial judge to make a
finding about whether the evidence is unreasonably incomplete, using
the special criteria applicable to the defense."° If the finding is nega-
tive, then the prosecution would be foreclosed from such argument
and its supporting evidence. Conversely, if the finding is affirmative,
the argument would be permitted and the judge would instruct the
jury, in non-binding terms, as to the judge's affirmative determina-
tion. Thus, the jury would be informed of the trial judge's reasons for
believing that either (i) the defense intentionally (or negligently) de-
stroyed potentially relevant evidence, or (ii) the defense has exclusive
access to such evidence but has not presented it."1 The defense would
then be free to challenge such reasons before the jury, and the jury
would be told that it is not bound by the judge's opinion." 2
Conclusion
Current law and practice reflects a decided ambivalence toward
the problem of missing evidence. For good reason, we want to tell
jurors that they should decide the case on the basis of evidence ad-
duced and not on the basis of guesses as to what has not been pro-
duced and why. And we often tell them just that.' On the other
hand, we feel compelled to back off from this stance in situations
where, in the opinion of the judiciary, the evidence may well be un-
reasonably incomplete. Commonly, this is done by authorizing the
jury to do precisely what we generally want them not to do, a practice
rife with difficulties.
My main point is that the solution to this ambivalence lies in the
recognition that, in an adversarial system, no less than an inquisitorial
one, it is the duty of the trial judge to assure that the trier of fact is
not placed in the position of having to decide a case under conditions
of unreasonably incomplete evidence. It is a duty owed to the par-
ties, the jury (if there is one), and to the public at large. The fact that
100. These special conditions are articulated at the end of section IV, supra.
101. Obviously, under current law such an instruction is ruled out when it would vio-
late a constitutional privilege, such as the privilege against self-incrimination. This excep-
tion will cover the most important source of information exclusively available to the de-
fense, namely the testimony of the accused. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
102. This may not be possible in those jurisdictions that prohibit judicial comment on
the evidence, but even in such contexts the comment suggested in the text is legitimately
differentiable as involving comment on evidence not presented rather than comment on
the credibility or persuasiveness of presented evidence. Moreover, this is a special situa-
tion where the nominally appropriate judicial response to a failure to meet the burden of
production is forgone out of necessity, and thus an exceptional attitude toward judicial
comment would be defensible.
103. See, for example, the standard jury instruction quoted supra note 95.
[Vol. 49
EVIDENTIAL COMPLETENESS
adversarial adjudication relies principally on the parties' incentives in
order to discharge this duty does not relieve the judiciary of ultimate
responsibility. Nor does the fact that adversarial incentives are gen-
erally effective in achieving a reasonable completeness of the evi-
dence.
The question of how best to discharge that judicial duty is a
complicated one. The factors to be considered are numerous and
permit wide variations among cases, thus complicating the task of
formulating a comprehensive set of guidelines. For that reason,
many of my conclusions are negative in character. Most importantly,
one ought not to submit to a jury consideration of the possibility that
evidence suffers from incompleteness unless it is unavoidable, as in
criminal cases, and unless one gives the jury meaningful and efficient
assistance in performing its task of evaluating the significance of such
incompleteness. Further, if the jury is to be involved, one ought not
to use instructions that invite the jury to make a finding about
whether evidence has been suppressed, as distinct from instructions
that simply authorize the jury to consider evidence of suppression
(and thus the probability of suppression) for what it is worth. Simi-
larly, one ought not to use instructions that focus on the relative su-
periority of access to evidence, as distinct from one that indicates the
relevance of exclusive (reasonable) access by one side in the dispute.
My affirmative approach derives from these negative conclu-
sions. I have argued that, in the absence of an adequate response un-
der the rules of admissibility, the optimal approach in most civil cases
is for the trial judge, upon an appropriate motion and with reason-
able notice to the adversely affected party, to preclude an issue from
proof by determining it summarily based on the failure to discharge
the burden of production. In the case of reversible deficiencies, that
burden should fall on the party with exclusive or superior access to
the evidence, or, in default of superior access, upon the party with the
burden of persuasion. But if litigative incompleteness is no longer
reversible, then the burden should be allocated on the basis of the
comparative fault of the parties in creating that situation. The same
points apply as against the prosecution in criminal cases.
However, in criminal cases when the accused bears responsibility
for the evidential deficiency, and perhaps in civil cases where the is-
sue is of the type I have called non-litigative incompleteness, the issue
of what to do with evidence tending to show unreasonable incom-
pleteness may be entrusted to the jury, using instructions that avoid
104. In particular, my arguments are short of comprehensive in that they do not ad-
dress the issue of what to do when the incompleteness of the evidence becomes known
only after judgment is entered. The principle of finality that enters here raises further
dilemmas that I have not attempted to resolve.
Mar. 1998]
the pitfalls described above. Under the most plausible articulation of
the distinction between litigative and non-litigative incompleteness,
the one that gives the least scope to jury involvement, this response
will be appropriate only in case the party renders evidence no longer
reasonably available by faulty conduct occurring before a lawyer is
consulted and under circumstances such that evidence of that conduct
would be admissible apart from its relationship to evidential incom-
pleteness and despite any issue preclusion resulting therefrom.
I do not pretend to have uttered the last word on how the dis-
tinction between litigative and non-litigative completeness should be
drawn, but I hope to have convinced the reader that it should be
drawn so as to favor judge-centered responses much more so than is
true under present practice. However the distinction is articulated,
the decision whether a particular issue involves litigative or non-
litigative incompleteness is one to be made by the trial judge, not the
jury. Moreover, if the judge determines that any unreasonable in-
completeness of the evidence is litigative, and also determines that
any such litigative incompleteness is not unreasonable after all, that is
the end of the matter, even in criminal cases; there is no submission
of the issue to the jury, and the parties are not free to argue missing
evidence inferences. Indeed, upon request of a party, an instruction
may appropriately be used to preclude the jury's consideration of the
fact of omission.
Most of these prescriptions can be achieved under the present
state of the law. It is primarily a matter of the will of the courts to do
so. It is important that they accept the responsibility to assure that,
except in compelling circumstances, trials do not proceed to the usual
determination of whether the burden of persuasion has been satisfied
when the conduct of the party has rendered the evidence unreasona-
bly incomplete.
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